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Its highly fragmented structure of local governments and serious horizontal fiscal imbalances 
make Switzerland a surprisingly powerful model for Eastern European countries that are 
currently facing the challenge of fiscal decentralization. In spite of the substantial differences in 
the tradition and current practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations, transition economies may 
learn valuable lessons from the Swiss case in the fields of direct democracy, horizontal 
cooperation, expenditure and revenue assignment, and fiscal discipline. Among other 
conclusions, the paper suggests that subnational authorities can effectively fend off 
recentralization attempts of the central government if they engage in spontaneous cooperation to 
enhance the efficiency of public service provision. Together with an adequate fiscal equalization 
scheme, interjurisdictional cooperation also permits the reconciliation of the objective of an 
increasing devolution of powers with the existing regional disparities. It is also shown that the 
principle of subsidiarity can best be safeguarded by anchoring the expenditure and revenue 
powers of subnational governments in the constitution or in a similarly strong law. With regard to 
fiscal discipline, the combination of a "golden rule" with direct democratic instruments of budget 
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 1    INTRODUCTION
1 
This paper deals with the institutions and actual problems of fiscal federalism in the case of 
Switzerland. Beyond the description and the analysis of the Swiss model, the objective of the paper 
is to examine how it can serve to address the structural problems of fiscal federalism in the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter TEs). We are well aware of the difficulties that 
this particular theme setting may raise, and especially aware of the problem of "transplanting" 
elements and techniques of fiscal federalism from a genuine federal country with long historical 
traditions in bottom-up democracy, into unitary states with a very short history of top-down 
decentralization. As the OECD puts it in one of its recent studies, "economic efficiency and equity 
principles are often secondary to historical and political considerations. It is thus not easy to 
replicate the incentive structures of one country in another" (OECD, 2003: 144). 
 
The scope of our analysis covers the decentralized unitary countries of the Central and Eastern 
European region: eight new member states of the European Union (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia), two of the current EU candidate 
countries (Bulgaria and Romania), as well as the unitary countries of the Balkan area (Albania, 




  The paper is divided in three sections. Starting in section 2 with a short summary of some issues 
in fiscal democracy that are relevant to Swiss decentralized public finance, the paper describes in 
section 3 the main components of the fiscal structure and the assignment of functions and revenue 
sources at decentralized levels, with special regard to taxation. In section 4, two fundamental issues 
of budget policy are analyzed. 
 
  Since the first Constitution of 12th September 1848, Switzerland has been, in institutional terms, 
a relatively complex system of three layers of government: (1) the communes, at the local level, (2) 
                                                 
1    Unless stated in the text, all statistical data refers to 2001. Relevant issues for TEs are marked with the sign ¾ at the 
beginning of the paragraph.  
2   We have deliberately chosen to omit the federal states of Eastern Europe (the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 
the federal state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Russian Federation). This strategy allows us to focus our comparison 
on a relatively homogeneous group, namely the unitary decentralized countries. The lessons that federal TEs might draw 
from the case of another federal country are likely to be very different from what unitary TEs would learn from the same  
2 
the Cantons, at the intermediate level, and (3) the Confederation, at the national level - which are 
interconnected by many vertical and horizontal relationships. In 2001 there were 26 Cantons and 
2880 communes (see Table 1 for some general indicators of the Swiss Cantons). 
 
 Fiscal  federalism  in  Switzerland can be characterized in terms of overall fiscal restraint and 
minimizing the centralization of fiscal power. It is a “bottom-up” federalism. Constitutional 
arrangements, both at the federal and the cantonal levels, certainly explain this situation. The 
subsidiarity principle (see section 3.3.2) has been probably more scrupulously respected in this 
country than in many other federations because of both constitutional guarantees and a traditional 
mistrust of nation-wide policies. In addition, the Cantons and the communes are seen as public 
policy and management laboratories carrying out policy innovations without great risk for damaging 
the overall economy, since the upper-level government (the Confederation or the Canton) will not 
provide a bailout. As a consequence, the power to decide and finance the provision of public 
services has remained largely (and jealously) in decentralized hands, in the Cantons or in the 
communes. Many forms of cooperative federalism have flourished in the last decades, whether in 
formal institutions like the inter-cantonal treaties or informal, like the inter-cantonal conferences of 
ministers or those of high civil servants for various functions.  
 
  The fairly extensive autonomy of cantonal and local governments for their finance is not 
unlimited. First, many cantons have introduced their own constitutional rules with regard to 
(balanced) budget and debt limitation (section 4). Fiscal competition between jurisdictions – tough 
partly softened by rules of tax coordination and harmonization – is a second limit (section 3.4). 
However, autonomy in public expenditures, direct access to many revenue sources and, above all, 
differences in the Cantons' economic potential (see Table 1, columns 6 to 8) have led to relatively 
important regional disparities, expressed in the fiscal burden of the Cantons and in their financial 
capacity. These disparities are at the core of the Swiss equalization policy, even though there is no 




                                                                                                                                               
country case. 
3    The Swiss equalization policy is not discussed in this paper. See DAFFLON B. and S. PERRITAZ (2000b) and  
3 
 
2   FISCAL  DEMOCRACY 
  In fiscal federalism, institutions play a double role in shaping the relations between the layers of 
government. First, institutional arrangements should permit the jurisdictions at the decentralized 
(regional and local) levels, and to the civil society, to express their views on the public policies which 
are under discussion and take part in the process of decision-making. Second, once the decisions 
are taken, individual jurisdictions and citizens should accept them, even contrary to their opinion, 
and respect their consequences. It is therefore of interest to shed some light on the working of  the 
institutions in Switzerland, particularly on the rules and principles, which govern the assignment  of 
functions and revenue sources to decentralized jurisdictions. Four institutional characteristics are 
essential in the working of Swiss federalism: (1) the vertical division of power in the Constitutions, 
(2) direct democracy, (3) initiatives and referenda and (4) horizontal cooperation between 
governments at the cantonal and communal levels. 
 
 
2.1    The vertical division of power 
  The Swiss federal system emphasizes the sovereignty of subcentral jurisdictions, i.e. the 
Cantons and the local communities. This sovereignty is derived from the federal and cantonal 
constitutions, which lists not only the tasks of each government level, but also fix their right to levy 
some sorts of taxes. Thus, the assignment of competencies and revenue sources is guaranteed at 
each level of government. The vertical division of power, intended to prevent stable majorities from 
being able to exploit minorities, is strongly safeguarded in the Constitution (KNAPP, 1986; 
ZIMMERMANN, 1987).  
 
  Article 3 of the new Federal Constitution of April 18, 1999 (Cst.) guarantees the Cantons' 
sovereignty in all the spheres in which the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the federal 
government's competence. Article 42 Cst. defines in a restrictive manner the assignment of 
functions to the Confederation: "it shall accomplish the tasks which are attributed to it by the 
                                                                                                                                               
DAFFLON (2004).  
4 
Constitution." 
4 Therefore, each new competence of the center requires a constitutional amendment, 
which necessitates the consent of both a majority of the voters and a majority of the Cantons. In 
contrast, article 43 Cst. stipulates that "the Cantons shall define the tasks which they shall 
accomplish within the framework of their powers." At cantonal level, there is no need for a 
constitutional explicit clarification. At the federal level, the autonomy of the Cantons is also 
guaranteed by the legislative power with two Chambers which have equal power (art. 148 Cst.). The 
National Council (House of Representatives) is elected on the basis of population in the Cantons 
according to the system of proportional representation. The Council of States (the Senate) consists 
of 46 delegates of the Cantons, two for each canton and one for each half-canton (Appenzell Rh. Int. 
and Appenzell Rh. Ext., Basel-City and Basel-Land, Nidwald and Obwald) irrespective of its 
population, size or economic and financial power.
5 The Cantons regulate the election of their 
Senators. 
¾  Except for three states – the Russian Federation, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 
and the federal state of Bosnia and Herzegovina – none of the Central and Eastern European 
transition countries has a federal structure. This is mainly due to the fact that formally federal states 
– the Soviet Union before the end of 1991, Czechoslovakia prior to 1993, and Yugoslavia until the 
early 1990s – provided rather negative examples of federalism. Initially conceived as a "brotherly 
association of liberated people and a convenient framework for diverting nationalism in a harmless 
direction” (MASTNY, 1998: 11) socialist federations turned into completely centralized states without 
any substantial devolution of power to constituent states, municipalities, and ethnic groups.
6 
 
¾  All TEs reviewed in this paper are unitary countries that engaged themselves in a process of 
political, administrative and fiscal decentralization from the early 1990s. The constitutions of these 
states recognize the right of local communities to self-government, except for Latvia and Lithuania 
where the constitution does not contain such a provision (see line 2 in the Box A below). With regard 
                                                 
4   The Constitution of 1999 replaced that of 1872 which was amended so many times and overloaded with so many details 
that it had become difficult to read. The 1999 Cst. is not "new" in essence but reorganizes in a modern way the previously 
existing articles. There are only a few innovations - see note 8. Title 3, chapter 2 of the new Federal Constitution of 1999 
provides the enumeration of federal competencies. The constitutional articles also fix the role of the Cantons for those 
functions. It follows that for a large number of public expenditures, the Cantons have only residual autonomy and act rather 
as "agencies" for the center.  
5   This means in fact equal power for each Senator, although a Senator of Appenzell Rh. Int. represents about 15,000 
residents and a senator from Canton Zurich about 600,000 residents, that is forty times more (see Table 1, column 4). 
6   For an excellent overview of the historical experience of federalism in Central and Eastern Europe, see (MASTNY, 
1998).  
5 
to the vertical division of power, however, none of these constitutions provide a similarly strong 
safeguard for devolution as does the Swiss federal constitution. Contrary to the power-sharing 
model typical to federal countries – where federal competences are enumerated and residual 
powers rest with the constituent states –, the constitutions of the decentralized unitary TEs define 
first of all the powers of the intermediate and local levels of government, and leave the residual 
competences to the center. 
 
Box A    Constitutional provisions in selected transition economies 
 
    AL BG MC CR SL RO HU CZ SK PL ES LA LI 
1  Federal  structure  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
2  Local  self-government  + + + + + + + + + + + 0  0 
3  Fiscal  autonomy  + 0 + 0 + + + + + + + 0  0 
4  Extent of fiscal autonomy  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
5  Competence-competence  + + + + + + + + + + + +  + 
6  Number  of  subnat.  gov.  tiers  2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2  3 
7    - of which: democr. elected  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  1  1  1 
Legend: 
AL = Albania, BG = Bulgaria, MC = Macedonia, CR = Croatia, SL = Slovenia, RO = Romania, HU = Hungary, CZ 
= Czech Republic, SK = Slovakia, PL = Poland, ES = Estonia, LA = Latvia, LI = Lithuania. 
(+) the issue appears in the constitution, (0) the issue does not appear in the constitution. 
Source: (ADAMOVICH 2003: 130). The data for SK and SL have been updated following the establishment of 
regional self-governments in 2001/2002. The records for ES, LA and LI have been added by the authors. Line 6: 
the NUTS-II level administrative regions that were established with the sole aim of managing EU Structural 
Funds are not considered. 
 
 
¾  While local autonomy is generally recognized by the constitutions of unitary states, and 
subnational jurisdictions are most often granted some budgetary autonomy (line 3), the extent of this 
autonomy is not defined (line 4). Rather there are constitutional provisions that give the parliament 
the highest competence to decide about the budget of the entire government sector including 
subnational governments (“competence-competence”, line 5). This manifests itself most commonly 
as the power of the legislative branch to determine the national budget, taxes and public fees. 
Constitutions that stipulate the right to local self-government usually also contain a promise that  
6 
mandated responsibilities of local units shall be financed from the central budget. The limits of 
subnational fiscal autonomy, however, are defined in separate laws. This may provoke serious 
problems when it comes to the demarcation of expenditure authorities between government tiers 
(see section 3.3.2). 
 
  The vertical division of power in Switzerland leaves a high degree of autonomy to the Cantons 
but also creates problems for the larger municipalities. On one side, the Cantons have their own 
fiscal systems that are, for a substantial part, independent from the federal system. The Cantons are 
therefore able to set their own tax rates, and they decide on the provision of public goods and 
services on their own. Although the modification procedures are long and complex, each 
voter/taxpayer in a canton or in a commune is able in the end to compare the costs and benefits of 
the public activity under consideration and to decide on the amount of public expenditure in a vote or 
in a referendum. However, on the other side, large municipalities or agglomerations, like that of 
Zurich, which alone has more residents than the five neighboring Cantons, create spillovers over 
cantonal boundaries, but do not have the legal possibility of negotiating directly with municipalities 
beyond those cantonal borders. 
 
  Up to the new 1999 federal Constitution, fiscal arrangements have been discussed either at the 
federal-cantonal levels or at the cantonal-local levels. The federal government addressed itself 
always and exclusively to the Cantons. It could not by-pass cantonal governments to address local 
governments either to impose or to negotiate fiscal or financial matters or the provision of public 
services. The inverse was also true: local governments could not by-pass cantonal authorities; they 
had no direct access to federal bureaus or institutions. In this way, federal decisions concerned the 
Canton only; and each canton organized communal competencies on its own. Although 
agglomerations have a statistical definition, and have been an expanding economic reality for the 
last decade, only the new 1999 Federal Constitution gives them an institutional recognition.
7  
Rapidly, local authorities in large urban areas have claimed a right to address the federal state 
directly, particularly where the agglomeration boundaries encompass several cantons. But a direct 
                                                 
7   The Federal Constitution of 1999 contains for the first time an explicit reference to the communes and municipalities. Art. 
50 says: “(1) The autonomy of the communes is guaranteed within the limits fixed by cantonal law. (2) In its activity, the 
Confederation shall take into account the possible consequences for the communes. (3) In particular, it shall take into 
account the special situation of cities, agglomerations, and mountainous regions.”    
7 
relation between an individual commune and the center is not in the tradition of this country and will 
probably still not be so for many years to come. This has led to the setting up of a tripartite 
committee, in February 2001, with representatives of the association of Swiss cities and 
agglomerations, the Cantons and the Confederation (DAFFLON and RUEGG, 2001: 43-45). What 
will be the effective consequences of article 50 of the Federal Constitution and the policy proposal of 
this committee is not yet clear. 
 
¾  In all TEs within the scope of our analysis, the central government and the municipal 
governments are allowed to address each other directly, by-passing the intermediate level(s) of 
government. In Hungary and Albania, by-passing the intermediate level in the communication 
between municipalities and the central state is not an exception, but the rule. Both local and 
provincial (county or district) governments are directly accountable to the central government, so 
that the intermediate level does not have control power over municipalities in any circumstances. 
Without questioning the reasonability of these practices in their specific contexts, it must be noted 
that the reasons here are much different from those in the Swiss case. Instead of the growing needs 
of urban agglomerations, by-passing the intermediate level in Eastern Europe signals the need for a 
strong control of central government over local spending behavior, in the interest of macroeconomic 
stability. 
  In Switzerland, the lack of direct contact between local and national authorities may in fact lead 
to awkward situations, especially when Cantons hinder their constituent local governments from 
expressing their complaints about cantonal authorities toward the federal government. On the other 
hand, one can question why municipalities in large urban areas, with spillover effects spreading out 
on municipalities in neighboring cantons (as is the case in Zurich), should address themselves 
directly to the federal government for solving urban problems. Normally, federal government should 
deal with nationwide issues rather than with the problems of particular urban areas which, however 
important they may be, rest on a subnational scale. In Switzerland the argument goes that if the 
same types of problems arise in most urban areas, the federal government should bother and 
intervene to provide a general legal framework that allows local solutions and prevents local 
authorities from pursuing free-rider strategies. 
  
8 
2.2  Direct  democracy 
  Direct democratic participation is provided in most cantonal constitutions for the communes so 
that citizens themselves may take part in the decision-making process on all important political and 
economic issues. In local public finance, this competence concerns the current budget, the annual 
tax coefficients, user charge regulations (taxation according to the benefit-principle in general), 
individual investment items of the capital budget, local public property sale or purchase, horizontal 
cooperation in the form of inter-communal association or special purpose district for the joint 
production of public facilities, and the amalgamation of communes. 
 
  In addition to participation, control and audit competencies of some sort exist in all direct 
democracies. The communal assembly of citizens, or the communal "parliament" where it exists, 
elects a finance committee for the length of the political term of office. This committee has not only 
traditional audit competencies, but also the duty to report to the assembly about changes in taxation 
and user charges, and about the financial aspects of capital expenditures. In addition, it has the 
powers to investigate financial matters without warning if necessary. In some cantons, it may lodge 
a complaint against individual members of the local authorities for misuse of public funds. 
 
2.3    Initiative and referendum 
  When democracy is representative, which is the case in a large majority of the Cantons and in 
large cities, voters express their preference about political and economic issues mainly via 
referenda, which may be brought up for vote several times during a year. Together with popular 
initiatives, these institutions play a role of moderator for cantonal and local governments, as usually 
all important public decisions are subject to the voters' approval.
8 At the local level, the most 
common items which might be included in the initiative or the referendum procedure are: taxation, 
user charge regulations, individual investment items of the capital budget, property sales, 
cooperation in inter-communal associations or special purpose districts, and the merging of 
communes. 
                                                 
8  In most Cantons, constitutional or legislative initiatives are possible on taxation and user charges, new repetitive current 
expenditures  or single capital expenditures,  which require a minimum number of citizens' signatures. Referenda against 
capital, unique or recurrent expenditures  are also possible. The institutional and legal conditions about the distinctions 
between compulsory or facultative referendum, unique and recurrent expenditure, capital or current expenditure, the number 
of signatures required, the time allowed for collecting the signatures, differ widely from one canton to another. While the 
influence of referenda in general on the outcome of the public budget are known, the influence of the detailed cantonal   
9 
 
Obviously these institutions of the federal system do not have a unique purpose of (economic) 
efficiency in the performance of expenditures and taxation. The more direct and democratic the 
institutions are, the better is their general capacity to strengthen the system of checks and balances, 
by both dividing and sharing political decision-making power. They give citizens/voters/taxpayers 
multiple access to government, increase their capacity to control the budgets and reduce political 
and bureaucratic leeway in rent-seeking behavior. In HIRSCHMAN's terminology, they not only have 
the "exit" (Tiebout-style mobility), but also the "voice" solution. As a result, the growth of the 
government sector is significantly lower than in representative democracy (POMMEREHNE and 
SCHNEIDER, 1978), the size of government is limited (POMMEREHNE, 1978) and public 
expenditures are driven by the demand side (KIRCHGÄSSNER and POMMEREHNE, 1990), 
(KIRCHGÄSSNER, FELD and SAVIOZ, 1999). 
  
¾  Direct democracy in TEs enjoys an ever growing importance but has by far not exhausted its 
potential. Today in the vast majority of TEs referenda, initiatives and public hearings are provided for 
in the national constitution or in the act on local government. In contrast with the Swiss case, 
initiatives in TEs may not directly lead to the introduction of a new regulation but simply launch a 
debate or a referendum on key municipal issues. Municipal councils may be obliged to call a 
referendum on certain issues and hold facultative voting on other issues, but in many cases the 
results are advisory in nature. Referendum, along with other forms of direct democracy, has not 
been used very intensively in TEs, and both the design of such referenda and the rate of 
participation have been rather poor. In addition, there is scope for further improvement in the 
enforcement of existing laws concerning citizens' rights to direct democratic participation.  
 
¾  The main reason for the low level of utilization of direct democratic instruments could be the fact 
that open communication and the exchange of different political ideas are not yet anchored in the 
habits of citizens and politicians. On the other hand, as Frey points out, the oppressive and 
authoritarian governments during the socialist era encountered little opposition, as citizens feared 
that expressing their true views could entail sanctions. Hence politicians could think, wrongly, that 
                                                                                                                                               
referendum conditions, as a measure of budget orthodoxy, on public deficit and the indebtedness of the Cantons are 
presented in (PUJOL, 2000) and (NOVARESI, 2001).   
10 
the population was not interested in their decisions (FREY, 2003: 44). The majority of Central and 
Eastern European societies demonstrate a marked improvement in the participation rates. However, 
development was suddenly broken in ex-Yugoslavia where the devastating effects of the war made 
citizens wearied and indifferent to local politics, despite the well-developed culture of public 
participation and local self-management during the socialist era. Ignorance and indifference towards 
direct democracy in Eastern Europe is not easy to fight down today, as the agenda of local 
referenda continues to be restricted to a few formal issues, such as the amalgamation and 
separation of municipalities, intercommunal cooperation arrangements and public investments. In 
Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, issues related to the municipal budget and the 
introduction of local taxes and fees must not be addressed by referendum. Citizens' interest for 
direct decision-making obviously falls if referenda are only held on issues of marginal importance. 
Given the risks involved with economic and political transition, leaving all revenue and expenditure 
decisions to be decided in the framework of representative democracy is a rational means of 
controlling the macroeconomic situation of the country. As decentralization proceeds, however, the 
scope for direct participation may well grow larger in the near future, at least at the municipal level. 
 
¾  A better implementation of the existing rules of direct democracy and the extension of the range 
of issues tackled in referenda and other institutions are likely to enhance citizens’ interest in local 
politics (BENZ and STUTZER, 2002). Simultaneously, they increase the accountability of sub-
national governments towards their electorate. Referenda can also help to detect the preferences of 
large minorities and thus channeling intercultural or interethnic conflicts into a more democratic 
political process. In general, direct democracy enhances social capital (trust and honesty), which in 
turn affects the development of the economy in terms of both per capita income and subjective well-
being (FREY, 2003). 
 
2.4   Cooperative  federalism 
  In Switzerland, the federal and cantonal Constitutions permit intensive horizontal cooperation at 
the cantonal and communal levels of government. Horizontal cooperation is important for Olson's 
principle of fiscal equivalence (OLSON, 1969; VON HAGEN, 2003: 374 f.), so that the circles of 
deciders, beneficiaries and payers coincide. Cantons and municipalities are free to conclude 
agreements with one another on cooperation in the most varied areas and so establish themselves  
11 
the optimum size of area necessary for the performance of government tasks, for example the 
provision of certain public goods, from university funding (inter-cantonal cooperation) to school 
districts and water provision (inter-communal cooperation).
9  At the local level, where self-governing 
units are too small for providing local public services on their own, inter-communal cooperation is a 
viable solution. It helps not only to realize economies of scale, but also to avoid creeping 
cantonalization of local competences under the pretext that municipalities are too small and hence 
not efficient enough. At the cantonal level, the image is more contrasted: whereas inter-cantonal 
agreements are quite a success for several cantonal public policies and functions (university funding 
is an example), they have failed with regard to preventing harmful tax competition, the law on tax 
harmonization being left widely ignored or without real content against the arguments of regional 
autonomy in growth policies. 
 
¾  While the size of municipalities in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Poland (in terms of population) is 
comparable to the average local government size in Scandinavian countries, the rest of TEs are 
marked by a severely fragmented territorial structure. The municipalities in Hungary, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic are the smallest throughout the Eastern European countries reviewed, with an 
average population of 1,700 to 3,300. In all three countries, more than 90 % (CZ and SK: more than 
95 %) of all communes have less than 5,000 inhabitants (FEKETE et al.; 2002, KLING et al., 2002; 
LACINA and VAJDOVA, 2000). The reason of this fragmentation is a historical one. The structural 
reforms introduced during the socialist period usually led to the enlargement of local government 
units. From the 1990s, as a reaction to this forced amalgamation, thousands of municipalities 
decided to split up, so that the number of local units currently exceeds the original level of the early 
1950s. Similar to the Swiss case, small local government units cope with substantial deficits in their 
accounts or deficiencies in the provision of local public services – as they fail to realize the 
economies of scale. In order to enhance the efficiency of public service provision, central 
governments in all TEs allow and even promote horizontal cooperation, but the number of municipal 
cooperation agreements is still below the desirable level. This is partly due to the fact that 
municipalities, glad to have been relieved from centralized bureaucratic control, are reluctant to give 
up their autonomy. Another reason may be that the majority of small municipalities are still not 
                                                 
9   New forms of inter-cantonal cooperation, called FOCJ for “Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions”, are  
12 
familiarized with the modern management methods which would allow them to enhance the 
efficiency of public service provision. For sure, as long as grants from the central government 
ensure a comfortable and more or less reliable source of local income, municipalities will not be 
particularly motivated to beat down costs through intercommunal cooperation. With an increase in 
tax autonomy on the medium and long term, however, local governments are likely to become more 
interested in low-cost operations. In the short run, financial and legal incentives might present a 
bridging solution. Especially in the new member states and the candidate countries of the European 
Union, inter-communal arrangements are highly encouraged through favorable legislation and 
unconditional grants-in-aid. The aim of this policy is to create optimum-sized jurisdictions that are 
able to accommodate development projects in the framework of the EU Structural Funds. As the 
case of Switzerland shows, voluntary cooperation can and must be encouraged, as it helps to avoid 
the recentralization of local tasks. 
 
  Horizontal "face-to-face" cooperation between the Swiss Cantons has taken another form which 
was not foreseen in the Constitution. When the need for a nation-wide steering policy arises, fiscal 
federalism in theory suggests that this should be realized at the center, by the federal government. 
This is not always the case in Switzerland where the Cantons have organized themselves 
horizontally in a set of powerful committees, the so-called Conferences of Cantonal Ministers, one 
for each department in the administrative division of government executives, of which the 
Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of Finance (CCMF) is the most influential. From a 
constitutional point of view, fiscal/financial relations between the federal government and the 
Cantons cannot be tailored according to individual cantonal particularities or wishes. Equality of 
treatment applies, except within the equalization law. Although each canton could challenge or 
negotiate individually fiscal/financial arrangements  with the federal government, no single canton 
would have much chance in succeeding in modifying fiscal/financial arrangements for its own 
objectives, since any change applies (and indeed should be acceptable) to the other cantons. Within 
the Conferences, the Cantons negotiate common policies without interference from the center, then 
present a common package to the federal government. The objective of the CCMF is to discuss 
fiscal/financial matters which are of common interest to all or a large number of the Cantons. It has 
been organized not so much to coordinate and harmonize fiscal and financial affairs of the Cantons 
                                                                                                                                               
developed in (FREY and EICHENBERGER, 1999).  
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(horizontal relations), as to intervene more persuasively in federal-cantonal relations and to interfere 
in federal-only fiscal and financial matters. The Conference is not a constitutional institution. Yet, 
fiscal matters cannot be decided at the federal level without previous consultation of the CCMF. It is 
a powerful pressure group, regularly consulted by the federal Finance Administration. It has been 
successful in negotiating global financial packages in which the point of view of the Cantons differs 
from that of the federal government. It has played an important role in shaping federal finance, the 
federal tax system and tax harmonization, which was to remain “formal”, and has a dominant 
position in federal equalization policies (DAFFLON, 1995). 
 
  The Conference of the Cantons (CdC) also exerts a powerful balance against federal policy 
proposal. The whole process of a New Fiscal Equalization package, for example, which is presently 
under discussion, is a joint venture of the Federal Ministry of Finance and the CdC. Both the 
Conference of Cantonal Ministers and the Conference of the Cantons might be a food for thought for 
TEs, although on the medium term it is not very likely that their intermediate-level self-governments 
(where they exist) would gain a similarly influential position within the public policy arena. However, 
such representation of intermediate level interests may also be effected through cooperation among 
line ministry officials. In a substantial number of transition countries the intermediate level still 
consists of purely administrative territorial units of the central government, and in several others the 
provincial self-governments are under the strict control of parallel government agencies or line 
ministries. This by itself does not exclude the possibility that policy experts in the administrative 
territorial units, showing a great deal of expertise on the issue under discussion, carry out successful 
lobby-work vis-à-vis the related ministry of the central government. In the same vein, the Swiss 
experience shows that at local level such Conference of local government specialists on specific 
issues (for example social aid, local finance, territorial planning or primary education) are often more 
efficient in negotiating policy solutions with the Canton than the official association of municipalities. 
 
  At the local level in Switzerland, the main incentives for inter-communal cooperation are, 
traditionally, economies of scale and regional spillovers and, more recently, limited managerial skills 
in many small municipalities, especially when local governments function as production agencies for 
the center (Cantons or Confederation), as for example in the field of national environmental policies. 
Contrary to other federal countries and to most of the TEs, there are no deconcentrated “federal  
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agencies” that, acting as regional or local producers of services for the provision of public services, 
have to respect minimum standards set by the central government. The Cantons perform as 
“agents” of the center (the "principal") but may decide on their own how they wish to implement 
those services. Usually, these services are in turn assigned to the local tier. There is no duplication 
of similar producing organizations at the decentralized levels.  
 
  At the local level, there is no doubt that the opportunity to create inter-communal institutions has 
been largely used by the municipalities and has improved efficiency in producing and delivering local 
public services. According to a recent survey by LADNER et al. (2000: 71), there are around 20,000 
ad hoc institutions or specific units of inter-communal cooperation for less than 3,000 municipalities. 
But the multiplicity of inter-communal special purpose districts has created several institutional 
problems as well: a democratic deficit in the regime of communal assembly or local parliament, 
higher information and participation costs for individual citizens who henceforward belong not only to 
one commune but to several other "clubs", strategic blockages of votes by negotiating communes 
when a qualified majority is required, and the like (DELLA SANTA, 1996). This is actually a general 
problem in TEs, too. Besides, the general lack of cooperation skills, the fear of democratic deficit are 
major obstacles on the road to broadening cooperation, although the law provides for the possibility 
to create inter-communal institutions. 
 
  Despite these inconveniences, it may be precisely this executive flexibility of federalism which 
has long made it resistant to attempts of centralization on the part of the federal government vis-à-
vis the Cantons,  or on the part of the Cantons vis-à-vis the communes. It also explains why so 
many small communes can survive without merging and why the compulsory merging of too small 









3    THE PUBLIC SECTOR:   FACTS AND FIGURES   
  This section summarizes the overall present situation of the public sector in Switzerland at the 
three tiers of government. All figures are based on 2001. Tables 1 to 8 also exist for the period 1990 
to 2000:
10 but there have been no significant changes over this last decade. Section 3 is divided in 
four sub-sections: (a) general indicators concerning the Cantons, (b) the size and growth of the 
public sector, (c) public expenditures and (d) public revenues. Whenever possible, the current state 
of research on fiscal federalism in Switzerland is mentioned. 
 
3.1    General  indicators 
  The institutional issues presented in section 2 have of course a price to be paid in terms of 
economic efficiency and equity. The solutions and practical arrangements do not exactly correspond 
to the canon of fiscal federalism in the textbook. And they do not permit to level out all differences in 
the economy and the public sector. A few statistical data will illustrate this argument. Table 1 (Tables 
are given at the end of this paper) gives five general indicators about the organization and the 
economy of each Canton: the number of communes, the surface in km
2, population (total and 
density), national income in the Cantons (NIC) total and per capita, and a number of figures for 
public expenditures and revenues at the cantonal and communal levels.  
 
  Marked differences exist in the organization of local government, the number of communes, in 
size, population and national income, that one probably does not find in another federation.  
 
9  The number of communes in individual canton varies from 3 in Basle-Town to 400 in canton 
Bern; the number of municipalities has no correlation with the population size: with almost the 
same total population, Thurgovie, Soleure and Fribourg have respectively 80, 126 and 226 
municipalities. 
 
9  The area of the smallest Canton (Basel-Town, 37 km
2) is 0.5 % of the area of the largest 
(Grisons, 7,105 km
2). 
                                                 
10  Readers interested in the statistics of the preceding decade are requested to contact the authors.  
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9  The population in the least populous Canton (Appenzell Rh. Int.; 15,000 residents) is 1.2 % of 
that in the most populous (Zurich; 1,229,000 residents).  
 
9  In 2001, the Canton with the highest NIC was Zurich, with a total of 72,504 million SFr., that is 
21% of the NIC for 17% of the  population. The variation in per capita NIC is  rather  large: from 
71,733 SFr. in Zug to 33,616 SFr. in Jura, that is a ratio of 2.1 between the two Cantons with the 
highest and the lowest per capita NIC (or a range from 153 points to 72 points, for an average 
100 points = 46,970 SFr. per capita).  
 
There are also: 
 
9  Marked differences in the growth of per capita NIC between 1980 and 2001 (in real values). In 14 
of the 26 Cantons, the rate of growth has been higher than the national average of 18% for the 
period (that is on average less than 1% annual for the 21-year period), with a maximum at  38% 
in Schwyz  and a minimum at 1% in Geneva (Table 1, column 8).  
 
9 Figure 1 also presents the comparative position of the Cantons in comparing their NIC per capita 
for 2001 in nominal values (national average: 46,970 Sfr.) on the horizontal line and the growth 
of per capita NIC between 1980 and 2001 in real value (Table 1, columns 7 and 8) in vertical. 
The graph shows that, after some thirty years of national fiscal equalization policy and as many 
years of regional development policies, the cantons are mainly distributed into three quadrants, 
but for three of them: 
-  at one  end, in the top right quadrant, 8 out of 11 Cantons with higher-than-average 2001 NIC 
per capita are also ahead in terms of growth; 
-   in the bottom left box, 9 Cantons have remained in a bad position, with at the same time a 
NIC per capita and a rate of growth below national average; 
-  six Cantons (Uri, Appenzell Rh. Ext., St-Gall, Thurgovie, Lucerne and Appenzell Rh. Int.) 
have registered an improvement, with still  lower-than-average NIC per capita but higher-
than-average rates of growth;  
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-  the cantons of Basel-Town, Geneva and Glaris are the exceptions, with a lower-than-average 
rate of growth (bottom right box). 
 
  From this performance, one cannot say that both equalization and regional development policies 
have been very successful. Though it must also be remembered that the federal equalization policy 
has not a total "gap-filling" objective in setting revenue sharing formulas or equalizing grants. 
 
9  The financial capacities of the Cantons, represented in the official indicators given in Table  2, is 
yet another mean of measuring the economic disparities between the cantons. The total index 
contains four components, given in columns 2 to 5. For each component, the national average 
is marked with 100 points and the columns demonstrate the relative position of the cantons. The 
inverse of the tax burden corresponds to the formula {a tax indicator, the inverse of the global 
index of tax burden in canton "i" (that is, for each canton, 100 divided by the average global 
index of tax burden for 1995-1998; for the standard composition of the tax burden index, see 
Table 8)} and gives the relative weight of five major tax sources in the cantons. Tax revenues, in 
column 4, stand for a sort of a Representative Tax System: it is the sum of cantonal and 
communal tax yield of the same four major taxes, weighted by the previous index so that the 
cantonal results are comparable. The fourth component is a normative measure of the cantons’ 
expenditure requirements (needs or costs, this is not clear), combining population density and 
the importance of rural versus urban areas. The total index for the individual cantons varies from 
30 points in Valais to 218 point in Zoug, for an average of 100: this is a 7.27 min-max ratio used 
for fiscal equalization. But the weighted average before correction is 73.90 points in Valais for 
143.5 point in Zoug, that is a 1.9 min-max ratio.
11 
 
¾  Disparities of similar magnitude are observed in several transition economies. More than a third 
(35%) of the gross domestic product of Slovenia is produced in the Osrednjeslovenska region, which 
is more than the output of the eight regions with the lowest GDP combined (31.3 %).
12  While per 
capita GDP in the Czech Republic is almost evenly distributed across the rural regions (11,800 
                                                 
11  For a detailed analysis of the cantons’ financial capacity, see DAFFLON, 2004.  
12  Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, National Accounts First Release No. 88, June 23, 2004.  
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euros on average in 2000), it is almost three times higher in the capital city (30,667 euros).
13 
Similarly, there are remarkable differences in the population size as well as in the geographical area 
across intermediate level units. The most populous administrative region (Sofia city) in Bulgaria 
counts almost 9 times as many inhabitants as the least populous one (Vidin), and if only rural 
regions are considered, the differential is 5.5 (IVANOV et al., 2002: 178). In Hungary, the difference 
between the smallest and largest county in terms of area is 16-fold (but only about 4-fold if the 
capital is ignored). Disparities at the local level are even more striking, with the largest municipality 
in Hungary (Budapest) counting 1.8 million inhabitants, the second largest 206,000 and the smallest 
one only 12.
14 Upon the basis of the Swiss example, the following sections of this paper will provide 
evidence that the ambitions for a successful fiscal decentralization are not necessarily frustrated by 
extreme interregional disparities. 
 
3.2    Size and growth of the public sector 
  Differences in the public expenditures of the Cantons and the size of the cantonal public sector 
expressed in proportion of NIC are important: it runs from 11 % in Zoug to 33(-)% in Basle-Town in 
the first group of cantons with high financial capacity, and to a record 33(+)% in the canton of Jura. 
Yet this comparison must be interpreted with caution. Due to the strong organizational autonomy of 
the cantons, the distribution of competencies between the cantonal and the local layer varies from 
one canton to another. Hence, for any comparison, the two layers must be considered in their 
totality. Taken together, the average size of the cantonal and local public sector is about 31 % of 
NIC, with 19 % for the cantonal level and 12 % for the communes (Table 1, column 12 and 17). 
However, this proportion varies greatly across the cantons: the importance of the local public sector 
is less than 1 % of NIC in canton Basle-Town while it is almost 21 % in canton Neuchâtel. 
Regarding the proportion of local expenditures to cantonal  public expenditures, the vertical 
assignment of  functions results in four categories: 
-  in eight cantons (Basel-Town, Geneva, Nidwald, Basel-Land, Uri, Appenzell Rh. Int., Fribourg 
and Obwald) the cantonal public sector is almost twice as important as the communal one: the 
ratio "cantonal/local" is close to 2.0; 
                                                 
13  Source: Selected Indicators by Region, Czech Statistical Office, 2001. The data are calculated on purchasing power 
standard. 
14  Source: National Association of Small Municipalities, Hungary.  
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-  eight cantons show a ratio of about 1.5; 
-  in another seven cantons, the ratio is around 1.3; 
-  finally, there are only a few cantons where the local public sector has almost the same size as 
the cantonal one (Zurich, Schwyz and Neuchâtel).  
There is not a single canton where the proportion of local public expenditures to NIC is higher than 
the respective figure for the canton (Table 1, columns 12 and 17).  
 
  Table 3 shows the size and growth of the public sector over the period 1970 to 2001. In 2001, 
total public expenditures amounted to 156,780 million SFr. This includes (vertical) financial transfers 
between government layers or 31 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) without social security 
contributions (43 % with social security contributions). In proportion to GDP, the size of the public 
sector is still quite limited in comparison to other countries in Europe. The growth of public 
expenditures has been quite important both in relative and absolute values in two periods: 1970-
1980 and again 1990-2000. The relative share of the total public sector within GDP rose 4 
percentage points in both decades but remained stable around 26% between 1980 and 1990. It 
regained  proportion in the last decade, partly because the economic situation deteriorated and 
partly because social aid expenditures and unemployment benefits increased above historical 
levels. 
 
  The rates of growth of public expenditures for each layer of government followed a different trend 
over the period (Table 3, columns 6, 9, 12). At the local level, the communes accounted for a 
considerable increase of public outlays in the decade 1970-1980, with a rate of growth at 141 % 
which is higher than the total average. However, the subsequent periods witnessed a  continuous 
decrease in the public expenditure growth rate, so that it sank to 34 % between 1990 and 2000 
which is much lower than the average for the entire public sector (45 %). This may be interpreted as 
a sign of good expenditure management – which is partly true because the  communes are the first 
to react (and they react rather rapidly)  to economic changes. But for the entire period, the figures 
also suggest creeping centralization towards both the Cantons and the Confederation: the rates of 
growth of cantonal public expenditures were above national average in the 1990s and 2000s. The 
actual shares of the Confederation, the Cantons and the communes in total public expenditures 
correspond in aggregate values to 33, 41 and 27%. The repartition has remained stable for the  
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Confederation for almost 30 years around 31-32%. At the cantonal level, the share of total 
expenditures has been increasing from 39 % in the 1970s to 41(-)% in 2001. In difficult times (1990-
2000) a soft trend toward centralization at the cantonal level with the communal layer losing weight 
is perceptible. 
 
¾ In all of the transition economies reviewed, the role of the public sector has significantly 
decreased, with general government expenditures accounting for 45-60 % of GDP at the end of the 
last decade, which is still higher than the euro area average of 48-50 % (OECD 2004: 239; IMF 
2003a, 2003b). 
 
¾  As for the role of subnational governments, the number of their expenditure competences has 
substantially increased since the beginning of the 1990s. However, subnational expenditure levels 
still account for only  4 to 13% of national GDP and 8 to 23% of general government expenditures 
(see Box B below). One reason for these low rates is the general decrease in the volume of the 
public sector, which is due to a sudden drop in the GDP immediately after transition, accompanied 
by comprehensive macroeconomic stabilization programs. Poland, Hungary and the Baltic states 
show subnational expenditure rates high above the average, due to the gradual extension of the 
competences of local governments during the 1990s. Compared with the 41 + 27%  expenditure 
share of subnational governments in Switzerland, the figures for Central and Eastern Europe 
indicate that there is scope for further expenditure devolution. 
 
¾  A remarkable feature of TEs is the relatively weak role of the intermediate tier in public service 
provision. In the constitutions of most Central and Eastern European states there is no clear 
commitment in favor of the provincial (county, district) self-government. (In Bulgaria, Estonia and 
Lithuania elected self-governments at the intermediate level do not exist: the regional or district 
administration is part of the central government administration.) In the framework of the top-down 
decentralization process starting from the early 1990s, priority was mainly given to the restoration of 
self-government at the municipal level, whereas the role of the regions (or more broadly, the 
intermediate level of government) always remained uncertain (MARCOU, 2002: 16). The weak 
constitutional position of the intermediate level self-governments in TEs is partly due to the fact that, 
under the socialist regime, the soviet-type provincial councils acted as agencies of the center,  
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receiving more and more power from the central state to ensure totalitarian control over 
policymaking at the municipal level. Even after the first democratic elections had taken place at the 
national, regional (provincial, district) and local level, municipalities preserved a suspicious and 
fearful perception of mid-tier governments. Nevertheless, the new wave of regionalization may help 
to dissipate the concerns of local politicians. 
Box B          Subnational expenditures in transition economies














% of subnational expenditures to
total public expenditure
% of subnational expenditures to
GDP
 S o u r c e :  
(WORLD BANK, 2004; IMF 2003a, 2003b). Macedonia: data not available. 
 
 
¾  As Marcou observes, the prospect of European integration pushed the issue of regionalization on 
the forefront of the political agenda during the 1990s. In the first phase of these territorial reforms, 
the focus is not so much on the socio-economic dimension of regions as on the formal institutional 
changes (MARCOU, 2002: 14). Nevertheless, most TEs which conduct a regionalization program 
are very clear about their intention to fill the newly created institutional structures with genuine 
economic and political content. This is expected to result in a considerably strong intermediate level 
of government. An additional challenge will be to delineate the competences of the democratically  
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3.3   Public  expenditures 
  The assignment of  functions between the three tiers of government has been continuously 
changing over the 150 years of the Swiss Confederation's existence. The optimal division of 
competences depends upon the historical and actual state of intergovernmental relations, thus the 
question of which tasks should be assigned to which level of government has never been given a 
definitive answer (DAFFLON, 1992). The division of public expenditures may be explained in terms 
of subsidiarity and centralization. However, it must be noted that the whole process has been 
laborious and rather conservative, political strategies and bureaucratic locking often jeopardizing the 
results. 
 
  Articles 54 to 125 of the 1999 federal Constitution contain an exhaustive and detailed 
enumeration of the federal competencies. The Constitution  always states whether a function is an 
exclusive federal or cantonal matter and, with shared responsibilities, the limits of central 
interference in the cantonal functions. 
 
 
3.3.1  Exclusive functions and shared responsibilities 
  Total expenditures for each function performed by the three levels of government are 
summarized in Table 4. Responsibility is shared, to some degree, by the three layers of government 
in almost all fields of public intervention. Obviously, the Confederation is solely responsible for 
foreign affairs and to a less-than-full extent for national defense (91 %). But other items, like 
education, culture, sports and recreation, health, environment, roads, generally remain the main 
responsibility of the Cantons and the communes.  
 
  Table 4 also indicates the respective shares of public expenditures in proportion of the total 
budget of each of the three layers (column “within” – vertical) and the proportion between the three 
tiers (column “between” – horizontal).  If we look at which governmental tier is the biggest spender in 
single items : 
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(i) the  communes have the highest share in the budget items: environment (61 %), culture, sports 
and recreation (51 %), administration (41 %);  
(ii) the  Cantons have a dominant position in public order (66 %), health (58 %) and education (54 
%); 
(iii) The Confederation has an exclusive position in foreign affairs (100 %), a dominant position in 
defense (91 %) and assumes more than half of the public expenditure in finance (58 %).  
(iv) Although the cantons and the communes together spend more, the center has the largest 
single share in social affairs (42 %), economy (47 %) and transportation (49%).  
 
  The exclusive competence of one government tier in a function (as indicated by the amount zero 
in Table 4) occurs only in a few cases. Otherwise, the division of powers and the principle of 
subsidiarity apply. Thus, general functions must be subdivided. For example, under the heading 
“social affairs” in general (see Table 4),  the federal government plays an important but not dominant 
role (42 % of total social expenditures). The division of functions shows that the only domain where 
it plays a major role is social security (old-age pensions: 78 %, invalidity: 73 %). Surprisingly 
because one would think of a typical local public responsibility, "social housing" is more important at 
the federal level (52 %) than at the cumulated cantonal and communal levels (38 + 10 %): this is 
explained mainly through the importance of initiative specific conditional grants paid to the cantons 
for this function. "Illness insurance" and  the item “other social insurance” (mainly family allowances) 
are more important in the Cantons (with  total of  56 % and 59 % respectively). Social aid is shared 
almost equally between the cantonal and communal layers and, though it is recognized as a typical 
local function in Switzerland, the federal government pays 16 % percent of the total outlays. 
Communes assume almost exclusively the current costs of homes for elderly people (96 %). This 
type of vertical assignment exists for almost all sub-functions (see also education in section 3.3.2 
and environmental policies and health in section 3.3.3 for other examples); and again the division of 
expenditures varies from one canton to another. 
 
¾  Most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe have followed a similar pattern of 
expenditure assignment since the early 1990s, with an incremental devolution of responsibilities 
toward the subnational levels. While municipal authorities play a more significant role in public  
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service provision than provincial (regional) self-governments, the central government has retained 
important powers at the intermediate level through the territorial offices of line ministries. The central 
government and its deconcentrated territorial offices account for a considerable part of total public 
expenditures, leaving a very limited number of competences (and insufficient financial resources) to 
provincial governments. According to a plausible (but still tentative) explanation, the failure to vest 
newly elected provincial authorities with equally strong powers as those that the Soviet-type councils 
enjoyed during the  socialist regime, has led to a "power vacuum" which was then gradually filled by 
the regional offices of central authorities (SZIGETI, 2004: 166). As Kandeva observes for the 
Balkans, "where there are representative elected bodies – such as district or county councils – 
middle-tier governments become weaker and lose their former position as representatives of the 
municipalities and a superior level of local self-government coordinating the activities of the 
municipalities/communities in their territories. Where middle-tier governments have been created as 
territorial bodies of the central government, their powers in local governance increase, and 
consequently their controlling functions on the acts and actions of local self-government bodies 
increase as well" (KANDEVA, 2001: 32). In several countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Albania), recent reforms aim to work against this phenomenon by the establishment of 
democratically elected self-governing regions at the intermediate level. However, in many cases 
both the central government and the municipalities are reluctant to cede a part of their expenditure 
competences to the new units. Consequently, regions have usually exclusive competence for 
developing the regional economy but only a marginal competence in almost all other policy areas. 
Since recently, the redefinition of territorial structures – and  has imposed a growing pressure on 
decision-making bodies to reexamine the nature of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
 
¾  Another challenge in the domain of expenditure assignment concerns the clarification of certain 
terms. It is often unclear whether the maintenance of public assets (hospitals, schools etc.) and new 
investments are included in the responsibilities of local governments or not. As the Swiss case 
demonstrates, the fact itself that some competences are shared between different government 
levels and others are exclusive does not compromise the efficiency of revenue assignment, as long 
as the law provides for a clear demarcation of competences to avoid inefficient duplications. The 
“labor division” between government levels in terms of public service production, once it is anchored 
in the law, creates an opportunity for fine-tuning expenditure policies at each level (the distribution of  
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federal, cantonal and local responsibilities in environmental policies and education are two 
successful examples). 
 
  In Switzerland, the general trend in the division of responsibilities between the three government 
tiers has hardly changed for the last 30 years. When one particular function requires more resources 
compared to others, the growth of expenditures for that function runs almost parallel in the three 
levels. This is a very conservative situation. The various attempts to modify the existing 
constitutional division of tasks between the federal government and the Cantons have invariably and 
lamentably failed or produced insignificant results.
15 Changes in the relative position of the three 
tiers may however happen, due essentially to external circumstances. During the economic crisis of 
the 1990s, for example, the federal government was first faced with higher unemployment. 
Thereafter, the Cantons were concerned with individual social aid because individual unemployment 
often persisted longer than the period of unemployment benefits. The cantonal share in the total 
amount of financing social aid was 40 % in 1988, rose to 50 % in 1999, to go down again to a 43 % 
share in 2001, although the law has not changed in the period. With 41 %, the local tiers has also 
assumed an important share of these expenditures, mainly in the form of contributions to cantonal 
expenditures or in an agency role in paying for social aid at standard levels fixed by the cantons. 
This experience will certainly shape the future of this particular task and its assignment at the federal 
(unemployment insurance) and the cantonal levels (individual social allowances), with the main 
responsibility being taken away from the communes. 
 
 3.3.2    Subsidiarity  
  In Switzerland, the fundamental principle in the assignment of tasks between the various levels 
of government is subsidiarity. Competencies are vested at the local level and can be transferred to 
the cantonal level only insofar that the lower level is no longer in a position to provide a service  
"efficiently". In most cantons, a constitutional amendment decided by popular vote or, at least, a law 
decided by the cantonal parliament, sometimes subject to referendum, is necessary. The same 
                                                 
15   See the following reports from ad hoc  or special committees: Stocker Report 1966 on the revision of federal conditional 
grants and subsidies,  the special reports for a new assignment of functions and responsibilities between the Confederation 
and the Cantons, first bunch of measures in 1971, second bunch of measures in 1978. These three reports did not result in 
any great change: the elephant gave birth to a mouse. In the current version of the proposal on the New Fiscal Equalization, 
the chapter concerning the (vertical and horizontal) reassignment of functions between the Confederation and the Cantons is 
fiercely debated. Radical changes have been washed out in order to prevent the rejection of the entire package in the  
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principle applies to the relationship between the cantonal and federal levels. The transfer of any 
competence from the Cantons to the federal government requires an amendment to the federal 
Constitution, with a double majority vote of the people and the Cantons.  
 
  In reference to the concept of “subsidiarity”, the key questions are not semantic, but start with (a) 
the definition and measurement of “efficiency”; (b) who decides when the provision of a local 
(decentralized) public service is no longer “efficient” and (c) at which level the responsibility should 
be “centralized”. Opinions diverge about which "efficiency" criteria are appropriate for the 
organization (and reorganization) of functions within the three layers of government.
16  Economies of 
scale, homogeneity of  preferences, spillovers and congestion costs, are generally accepted as 
efficiency criteria (DAFFLON, 1992). But poorer governments argue that they are not able to score 
well enough for lack of sufficient budget resources, and so they ask for an increase in equalization 
payments.  
 
  As for the level of decision making, subsidiarity is a true "bottom-up" process with two 
inseparable elements in this principle:  
(1)  Competencies in the provision of public services belong to (or in terms of decentralization: 
“should be vested in”)  the lowest possible level in the fiscal hierarchy.  
(2)  It is the lowest level retaining the competence which decides and when it is no longer able to 
meet this particular responsibility and when and how it wants to hand it over to the next higher level.  
 
  The reference to "insufficient capacity" must be founded on sound economic arguments rather 
than on political or simple financial reasons. Transferring a function just for the fear of facing the 
electorate or the taxpayers is not reasonable. In case a commune is incapable to execute a specific 
public task, the first-best solution is not to transfer the task to the next higher tier but to examine the 
reasons why the available financial resources are insufficient. In this procedure, tax capacity as well 
as central government funding should be taken into account. 
 
  Education is a good example of how the principle of subsidiarity works. Table 4 shows that 
                                                                                                                                               
popular vote which will probably take place in November  2004. See (DAFFLON, 2004). 
16  See WALSH (1993: 32 ff.) for an overview of the normative arguments.   
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under the general heading of education, the main responsibility lies at the cantonal level, with 
around 54% of total public outlays, followed by the local level (33 %) and the Confederation (13 %). 
However, when various sub-functions are distinguished “bottom-up” within education, the image 
stands out in contrast. Kindergartens and public schools are principally in local hands (with 
respectively 63 % and 57 %). For the public (primary and secondary) public schools, however, the 
communes have command mainly of the school buildings and the equipment. The teachers’ salaries 
are predominantly paid at the local level, but according to cantonal  standards. The Cantons also 
decide almost exclusively about the teachers’ qualification, and the schools’ programs (for the latter, 
sometimes in coordination with other Cantons within the Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of 
Education – see section 2.4 on cooperative federalism). Special schools are in some cantons local, 
and cantonal in others. Professional schools, teachers’ schools, colleges and technical schools are 
predominantly if not exclusively placed at the cantonal level (the respective shares of total 
expenditures at the cantonal level are 71, 95 and 91 %). The federal government does not intervene 
very much. Except for the Federal Polytechnics, the 10 universities are cantonal, and partly financed 
by all the cantons through horizontal transfers shared according to the number of students and their 
cantonal usual residence, and through federal grants-in-aid.
17 
 
  The subsidiarity principle implies that some degree of asymmetry in the provision of public 
services is acceptable. Yet it is difficult to assert whether this couple "subsidiarity – asymmetry" is an 
appropriate tool to recognize diversity, whether more differentiation is needed to attain a more or 
less harmonized quality in service delivery, or whether it will foster national integration or 
disintegration. Again, education and primary schools can serve as an illustration. Subsidiarity and 
asymmetry are certainly needed and useful if the objective is to preserve or promote cantonal 
historical and cultural diversity: Geneva and Zurich have neither the same approach nor the same 
tradition in teaching history, which in turn differs in a bilingual Canton like Valais or Fribourg. There 
is no objective necessity for uniformity. But the Cantons have to harmonize and partly succeeded in 
harmonizing their public school programs because of the increasing mobility (private and 
professional) of parents between the Cantons. This has been achieved and is operative through 
                                                 
17  For the year  2001, the "Compte d'Etat “ of the Confederation (2001: 217) gives the following amounts for higher 
education: total expenditure amounts to 2,117 million Sfr. of which 1,365 million for the Federal Polytechnics in Zürich and 
Lausanne (65 %), 543 millions Sfr. for the cantonal universities (26 %) and 209 million Sfr. for the High Professional Schools 
(9 %).  
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intercantonal agreements. Yet, for example, the Cantons were unable to agree on the beginning of 
the school year (spring or autumn) to the point that it had to be fixed in the federal Constitution 
(article 62 in the 1999 Constitution) after a popular vote on September 22, 1985 with the double 
majority of voters and Cantons. Nowadays, teaching a second national language is at the crux of a 
difficult dispute. While the majority of the Cantons (and all the francophone Cantons or those with a 
French-speaking majority) advocates learning the second national language (German for the 
French-speaking, and vice versa) in first priority for reason of national cohesion, the Canton of 
Zurich decided in 2000 that in public schools, English rather than French will be given first priority for 
reasons of economic development and globalization. This has been criticized by many Cantons, 
including German-speaking ones, qualifying the decision an arrogant, disruptive and anti-confederal 
move. A federal parliamentary proposal is now on the way to oblige all the Cantons to consider 
another national language as the first priority. If it succeeds, this will be a further step toward 
creeping legal centralization. 
 
¾  All of the TEs in our analysis have ratified the European Charter of Local Self-Government 
(ECLSG), which means that, the subsidiarity principle (article 4 of ECLSG) has entered the political 
discourse on decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe, at least at a formal level. However, up 
to now the general acceptation of the principle has been limited to the component (1) of the 
definition above, which suggests that further efforts are needed in order to realize the bottom-up 
philosophy of this principle. In practice, its implementation proceeds relatively rapidly, while some 
important rules laid down in the Charter rest to be carried out in the next few years. As a general 
rule, the extent of subnational expenditure autonomy (the range of responsibilities and the 
modalities of change) is anchored in separate laws instead of the national constitution, and the 
amendment of these laws usually require only a simple majority.
18 Transferring competences from 
one government tier to another is thus relatively easy, which makes subnational governments in 
principle vulnerable to sudden changes in their autonomy. The fact that the central government has 
the highest competence to decide about the horizontal sharing of expenditure powers provides an 
ample room for centralization even where subnational budget autonomy nominally exists 
(ADAMOVICH, 2003: 131). 
                                                 
18  An exception from this rule is the Local Government Act of Hungary which can only be amended with 2/3 of the  
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¾  With regard to the transfer of responsibilities between subnational levels, Hungary provides a 
peculiar example of asymmetry According to the Act on Local Government, municipal authorities 
that do not feel able to finance a particular local task may transfer this task to the county level which 
is obliged to take it. Similarly, local governments of the county seats (i.e. major towns) may claim 
from the county level the downward transfer of any public institution (hospital, secondary school etc.) 
that is predominantly used by the residents of the town. In both cases it is the lowest level which 
decides when and how it wishes to hand it over to the higher level. Yet the subsidiarity principle is 
violated because the transfer of competences is based on a purely financial argument ("not able to 
finance"). As a result of these operations, public institutions with substantial infrastructural backlogs 
and low revenue-raising capacity get into the hands of the severely under funded counties which, for 
their part, hope for a rescue by the central government. 
 
¾  This lesson teaches that the subsidiarity principle heavily depends on the correct design of 
revenue assignment: subnational governments must be empowered not only to execute public tasks 
and provide services of local interest, but also to raise sufficient funds (through taxation and 
participation in revenue-sharing models and grant programs) to cover their expenses. 
 
3.3.3   Centralization 
  Table 3 gives the relative shares of each level of government in total public expenditures for the 
period 1970 to 2001. Over the first period, these figures show almost stable proportions in the 
division of the public sector between the three layers. In the decade 1970-80, the proportions  were 
32 % for federal expenditures, 39 % for the Cantons and 28 % for the communes. In 2000, these 
percentages were respectively 32, 40 and 27, which represents a slight increase of the cantonal 
share to the detriment of the communes. In recent year, this trend has continuously accentuated: in 
2001, for example, the respective share of the federal and cantonal tiers have consolidated around 
higher figures (respectively 33 and 41 %).  
 
  Although statistical data show that the relative shares of each tier have not much changed over 
the past 30 years, centralization creeps in the ways in which cantonal and communal governments 
                                                                                                                                               
parliamentary votes.  
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perform. A distinction, described in the literature of fiscal federalism as "agency" versus "choice" 
models, may be useful for understanding the issue. In the last three decades, the federal 
government has increasingly confined itself  to the issuing of framework laws and has delegated the 
implementation of nation-wide functions to the Cantons (which in turn often have transferred the 
tasks onto their communes) – which is the key characteristic of the "agency" model. One of the most 
impressive examples of this is the implementation of the federal environmental legislation. The 
federal government systematically issues normative legal rules (on the basis of art. 74 Cst.). The 
Cantons have to give impulses to their implementation, coordinate  (public) provision and control the 
results. The communes are the executive agencies. The importance of local public expenditures in 
environment is clear from Tables 3 and 4: it amounts to 61 % of the public outlays for this function. 
Incentive conditional grants were distributed along the way, but this is no longer the case, as federal 
financial  incentives were limited in time to the end of the 1990s. In Table 3, local public 
expenditures for water resources amount to 87 % of total expenditure for this function; 69 % for 
sewage and water purification plants and also 81 % for waste collection and disposals. In these 
functions, local user charges should cover at least 70 % of total current expenditures (including debt 
service for investments financed through borrowing), and ideally the total costs. 
 
Health is another illustration of the "agency" role of  the Cantons and the communes. The federal 
government is responsible for only a tiny proportion of health expenditures (around 1 %), mainly 
because health insurance is governed by a federal framework law. But the implementation of the law 
 and the resulting costs remain  in the hands of the Cantons (58 %) and the communes (42 %), with 
obvious problems along this way (DAFFLON, 2002b).  
 
  At the lowest level, there is continuous dispute in the Swiss Cantons about the effective extent of 
autonomy  in local public expenditures, first and foremost because no single measure of 
independence is appropriate (WOLMAN, 1990) so that the Cantons and the communes have 
divergent claims. A second difficulty in measuring a decentralization concept is that the fiscal-
financial relations between local and cantonal governments vary from one canton to another 
according to the 26 cantonal Constitutions. Yet, the general trend in all the Cantons has been that 
(1) under the constraint of a current balanced budget, the "choice" role of the communes has made 
more and more way for the "agency" role and (2) the change in the relative weight of the two roles is  
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inversely related to the population size of the communes: larger municipalities have been better able 
to maintain a higher proportion of  the "choice" role. In general one can say that probably around 1/4 
of total local current expenditures are made in response to standards set by higher government 
levels, 1/4 corresponds to ad hoc inter-communal institutions coordinating particular functions, which 
leaves about 1/2 for current expenditures resulting from the own preferences of local residents 
(DAFFLON and PERRITAZ, 2000a). 
 
  Now then, what can be said about the tension between subsidiarity and centralization? There is 
no simple answer, but a very pragmatic approach and case by case solutions. However, two points 
deserve attention. First, a higher level of government cannot interfere so easily so as to impose its 
own idea of "efficiency" upon a lower level of government. The democratic procedure must be 
respected. The amalgamation of two or several communes is a good example: this has proved 
almost impossible on a compulsory basis with the argument that communes are often too small to 
perform correctly the functions assigned to them. And the voluntary amalgamation of communes 
responds to another logic than strict fiscal consideration (DAFFLON, 1998). Second, if a function 
needs more centralization, it will not be enacted by agencies of the higher-level government, but by 
lower-level governments acting as agencies. Thus, the communes will first organize in special "inter-
communal" jurisdictions rather than giving up a function to the canton. And many federal standards 
are implemented by the cantons: law and justice are but two examples. In general, one finds no 
duplication of service precincts, federal agencies acting in the cantons, or cantonal agencies acting 
in the communes. The Communes act as implementation agencies of the canton or the 
Confederation, the cantons as agencies of the Confederation, most often with the capacity of 
performing more than required minimum service level if they want so, with the additional difficulty 
(from an analytical point of view) to distinguish what is the required standard and what is "choice" 
component. 
 
¾  Central and Eastern European transition economies have very similar concerns regarding the 
role of lower-level governments. Even though in the advanced reformer countries (Poland, Slovenia, 
Hungary, Latvia etc.) expenditures have been decentralized to a comparable degree as in 
Switzerland, the national regulation of the quantity and quality  of local services is still prevalent, and 
central authorities control the implementation by means of their deconcentrated territorial units. The  
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perceived need for uniformity partly derives from the relatively "underdeveloped" state of 
provincial/regional self-government, but also from the ambition to provide a standard minimum level 
of basic public services throughout the country. In the Balkans (Albania, Romania, Croatia and 
Macedonia) where real decentralization started with some delay compared to the rest of the Eastern 
European region, the presence of deconcentrated authorities and central government 
representatives (prefects) is even more visible, and their role in public service provision and local 
administration is almost as important as that of the elected self-governments. 
 
¾  Similarly to the Swiss cantons and communes, subnational governments in TEs are also obliged 
to execute delegated tasks in "agency" position. In the Czech Republic, the recently adopted Act on 
the Regions (129 / 2000) introduces a category called "transferred sphere of activities" (in opposition 
to the "independent sphere of activities"), which is more or less equivalent with the concept of 
"mandatory responsibilities". In several countries, these mandatory responsibilities account for a 
substantial share of local and mid-level expenditures, as a consequence to central government 
endeavors to ensure an equal level of basic public services throughout the country. However, as the 
amount of conditional transfers agreed by the center do not always entirely cover the costs of these 
mandated tasks, local governments feel increasingly impelled to fill the gap with own-source 
revenues in order to meet the minimum service standards. The agency problem in TEs concerns 
thus not only on the expenditure side (redirecting local expenditures towards centrally dictated 
activities) but starts to erode the own-source revenues as well. The exact dimension of this problem 
is difficult to measure, since the nominal statistics on the share of subnational expenditures within 
total general government outlays tell little about which proportion of these subnational expenditures 
is spent on prescribed activities. 
 
¾  Wrong responses on the part of central governments may involuntarily contribute to more 
centralization and to less responsibility at subnational levels. For example, the relatively small size 
of municipalities in TEs combined with a lack of willingness to cooperate often leads to budget 
hardships, as local governments cannot exploit potential scale economies. The central government's 
most common reaction to such fiscal bottlenecks – particularly if they jeopardize the provision of 
basic public services – is to make a bailout grant to the crisis-hit municipality. Obviously, the 
provider of the grant defines the conditions of  how to use the money, thus interfering (though  
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rationally) with the receiver's autonomy. Another inevitable corollary of the fragmentation of territorial 
structure and the unwillingness to cooperate is the shortage of skilled and specialized workforce and 
the lack of sufficient technical capacity, especially in the smallest municipalities. Such shortfalls in 
the administrative capacity are often addressed by transferring a part of the local government's 
competences to the territorial offices of the central government. In both cases there is creeping 
centralization, no matter how good the pursued intentions are. Of course, even if the expenditure 
and revenue assignment is perfectly designed, fiscal and technical bottlenecks will always occur, 
and hence a certain amount of intergovernmental grants will be inevitable. However, greater 
responsibility at subnational levels can only be achieved if local problems are addressed – whenever 
possible – with local solutions. Promotion of intercommunal cooperation and support to local 
capacity-building would be sustainable solutions for the above-mentioned problems. Moreover, the 
central government has less opportunity to encroach on local autonomy if bottleneck situations are 
not treated case by case but with a more integral approach. However, for such a strategy to be 
effective, it is essential that local politicians abandon the wrong habit (inherited from the era of 
centralized government) of accepting from the center any intervention that pledges to relieve them – 
at least temporarily – from the bottleneck problem. 
 
¾  To our view, the answer of the smallest Swiss communes to centralization efforts is worth some 
consideration. Through concluding various cooperation agreements and establishing special 
purpose districts on a voluntary basis, local communities in TEs, too, are likely to reach an 
acceptable level of efficiency in public service provision, thus proving that there is no need for the 
central level to withdraw any of the expenditure competences from the local level. 
 
3.4   Public  revenues 
  Funding local and provincial governments is a delicate issue in all Central and Eastern European 
countries where only a very few (if any) variables of the taxation formula are in the command of 
municipalities and the intermediate level. This leads to severe political conflicts between the various 
levels of government. It is therefore of importance to observe and analyze how public revenues are 
distributed in existing federations, particularly in Switzerland where the tradition of tax autonomy at 
the cantonal and local layers has been immovable for many decades. 
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  Between 1980 and 2001, there were 16 fiscal years for which the entire Swiss public sector 
(Confederation, Cantons and communes) registered a budget deficit. The balance of the accounts 
was positive in the period 1986-1989 and for the last two years reviewed, 2000 and 2001.
19  In 
2001, public revenues amounted to 159,804 million Sfr. compared to 156,780 million Sfr. total 
expenditures. Only the federal level was in the red.   
 
3.4.1     General  characteristics 
  Details of public revenue sources are given in Tables 5 and 6. Taxation is the most important 
single source of revenue for the three levels of government. The tax systems, the combination of 
various tax sources or the choice "taxes versus user charges",  the definitions and measurements of 
the tax bases, and the rate schedules are variables that are largely in the command of the cantons. 
Though to a lesser extend, communes have a fairly large tax flexibility (definitions are given below). 
Consequently  both layers determine the volume of financial resources at their disposal, thus the 




9  Each level of government and each government within the same level has direct access to many, 
but at least two major revenue sources: at the federal level, direct taxation and VAT; at the 
cantonal level, direct taxation and revenue sharing + grants; at the local level, direct taxation and 
user charges. Direct access to taxes and user charges at the cantonal and local levels is 
important in order to maintain financial autonomy. 
 
9  Based on VAT with an actual normal rate of 7.6 %, the main consumption and expenditure taxes 
are exclusive and belong to the federal level. Taxation on motor vehicle is cantonal; the 
communes can levy minor taxes on dogs, entertainment and games. 
 
9  Direct taxation is a joint taxation of the Confederation (individual income + corporate profit), the 
                                                 
19  Without the deficit of the social security. In 1993, the highest deficit ever was 16,325 million SFr or  4.6 percent of GDP. 
This result did not respect one of the Maastricht criteria, namely that the total deficit of the public sector, including social 
security,  should not exceed 3% of GDP. But in the period between 1980 and 2001 this was the only year in which the 
Maastricht criterion was not met.  
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Cantons and the communes (individual income and wealth + corporate profit and capital). For the 
Cantons and the communes, taxation of individual income and wealth and of corporate business 
profits and capital ("direct taxation") is the major single item of revenue sources (43 and 50 % – 
Table 6). 
 
9 For the communes, user charges from local public utilities (mainly: water, sewage and 
purification plants, garbage collection) and indemnities (in total 26 %) provide the second most 
important revenue source. Together with the revenues from public property (6 %) they account 
for one third of total resources. However, these sources are limited. Revenues from immovable 
properties, whether public or private, are subject to the federal legislation on rent control. The 
total amount of user charges for one single function cannot exceed total costs owing to the 
jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court with regard to the quid-pro-quo rule in benefit 





  At first glance, the Cantons and the communes have a rather low dependence on transfer 
payments: the Cantons receive less than 17 % of their total revenues in the form of specific grants 
from the Confederation, and the communes receive less than 13 % of their revenues from the 
Cantons. However, the reality behind this image is far from idyllic: a closer examination of the 
statistical series shows the nuances. Table 7 presents for each canton the proportion of total fiscal 
resources that is obtained through federal grant-in-aid and revenue sharing. This ratio can be 
considered as the degree of financial dependence of the cantons on external revenues.  
 
  Federal grants-in-aid are always specific, mostly conditional, and for some of them block grants 
based on performance output. They do really create a relation of dependence of the cantonal level 
toward the center since they are obtained for those functions only that are designated by the center 
and provided in the cantons. 
 
  Revenue sharing belongs to another category: those programs are written in the federal  
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Constitution and are historically considered as a right for the Cantons to obtain part of specified 
federal tax yields. They always take the form of block  payments, totally free in use at the cantonal 
level so that the constraint - or the loss of financial autonomy - is by far much more limited than it is 
the case with specific grants-in-aid.  
 
In Table 7, the degree of financial dependence varies from around  9(+) % for Basle-Town and 
Geneva  to as much as  50 % in  the cantons Jura, Obwald and Uri. Such a range, from 9.4 % to 
51.2 %, might seem extremely large for an outside observer, but it represents a true image of the 
disparities that still exist in this country. Not surprisingly, there is a reasonable (though not very 
strong) inverse correlation between the cantons' national income per capita and their dependence 
on federal transfers (r =  -0.563). However, a simple regression equation consisting of this single 
variable would explain less than one-third of the total variance in financial dependence (r
2 = 0.317). 
In order to learn more about what determines the degree of transfer dependence in a canton, 
several other factors must be examined in a multiple regression analysis.   
 
  Not only the degree but also the structure of dependence varies across the cantons. For 
example, the individual situations of the six richest cantons look like follows: 
 
 
 Zoug  Basle-Town Zurich  Geneva Nidwald Basle-Land 
Financial  capacity 218  158 157  130  124 120 
Financial dependence 
- total 
- grants-in-aid (GIA) 

























Ratio RS / GIA  1.88  0.48  0.48  0.74  0.23  0.35 
Financial capacity is given in points for a national average of 100. 
 
 
  In Zoug, revenue sharing dominates because the yield of the FDT is particularly high: the ratio 
"revenue sharing to grants-in-aid" is 1.88 (Zoug is the only canton where RS > GIA). In Basle-Town  
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and Zurich, this ratio is 48 % but the financial dependence of Zurich is twice that of Basle-Town. In 
Geneva and Nidwald, financial dependence almost reaches the extremes with 10 and 36 % 
respectively, yet the difference is essentially to be found not so much in the revenue sharing but in 
the high amount of federal grants transferred to Nidwald (29.1 %) in comparison to Geneva (5.6 %). 
One cannot say that the patterns of financial dependence and of RS/GIA ratio are even for these six 
(richest) cantons. 
 
¾  In most TEs, the transfer dependence of provincial and local governments is more serious than 
in Switzerland.
20 Grants from the central government in the subnational budgets account for a fairly 
high proportion of total revenues, up to 95% in Albanian municipalities. Subnational governments 
feel little motivated to raise own-source taxes as long as the central government continues to supply 
them with non-refundable grants (see the Box C for the role of tax revenues in local funding). This is 
true even though central funding for mandated expenditures often falls short of the subnational 
governments' expectations. Though an increasing number of local governments try to fill up their 
deficient budget with own-source revenues, their tax autonomy is still too often restricted to less 
productive taxes (the so-called "nuisance taxes" on dog-keeping, gambling etc.) The basic problem 
with these taxes is that collection costs might exceed revenues, as has been painfully perceived by 
most local governments. The imposition of tax rate ceilings and the uniformization of tax base 
calculation, as well as the restrictions on the range of local taxes are still common practice of central 
regulatory authorities. And even in countries with a relatively vast fiscal autonomy at subnational 
levels, regions and municipalities often refrain from introducing all types of taxes defined by the local 
tax law or exploiting the maximum rates, as they perceive that the national tax burden is already 
heavy enough and additional taxation at the local level would prompt taxpayers (residents and 
investors) to quit the jurisdiction. This problem cannot be resolved by simply granting a higher 
degree of tax sovereignty or tax flexibility to subnational levels with the tax competences of the 
center being unchanged. Rather, the center should cede a part of its tax room to the lower tiers of 
government. However, careful attention must be paid to how and when to enlarge local tax room. As 
central government funding for mandated functions is often insufficient, the leeway of subnational 
governments to decide and finance own preferences is very little anyway. For this reason, the 
                                                 
20  Surprisingly, however, in some of the decentralized unitary countries of Eastern Europe (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland)  
the share of grants in the subnational budget – in the average of the years 1995 to 2000 – is smaller than in some West- 
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reassessment of central funding for mandatory tasks should precede the introduction of new 
measures for the enhancement of local tax effort. 
 
 
Box C     Subnational public revenues in transition economies














% of subnational taxes to total
public revenues
% of subnational revenues to
total public revenues
 




3.4.2   Tax  sovereignty 
  There is a long and apparently endless debate in fiscal federalism literature about the conceptual 
definition of tax sovereignty. Tax sovereignty concerns both the ability of a government to decide 
which taxes it should invent and raise, the direct access to taxation and the management of taxes. 
Let us summarize the general setting in  the simplified  formula: 
 
T = t × [ B - (D1, D2, D3, …Di, … Dn )] × ( KFed  + Kcanton + Kcommune ) 
                                                                                                                                               
European countries with similar constitutional order, e.g. Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (OECD 2003: 148).  
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where    T   revenue from a tax 
      t  the  tax  rate  schedule 
      B  the  gross  tax  base 
       D  the possible deductions from the tax base 
       K  the annual coefficient aiming at a balanced (current ?) budget. 
   
Referring to this formula, the extent of tax sovereignty can be measured in the following sequences 
of choice : 
a)  the use of the ability-to-pay principle (taxes) versus benefit principle (user charges); 
b)  the object of taxation, implicit in […] in the formula above; 
c)  the circle of taxpayers (including the definition of the taxpaying unit); 
d)  the computation of the tax bases (for example, for the taxation of income: the definition of gross 
income [B], and the adjustments to taxable income, specific deductions and exemptions) [Di]; 
e)  the tax rate schedules [t], including the amount of deductions and exemptions in the previous 
letter [Di]; 
f)  the annual coefficient of taxation [Kj]; 
g)  collecting the taxes; 
h)  the procedure in case of tax dispute. 
 
- Full tax sovereignty comprises letters a) to h) in the list above.  
- Partial tax sovereignty exists where a government can decide a) and some but not all items listed 
between b) and e).   
- Tax flexibility means that a government can at least decide on the coefficient of taxation (f) but has 
no access to defining the kind of taxes it can raise.  
- Compulsory taxation qualifies taxation where a government has no choice over a) to f) and must 
raise taxes (or user-charges) according to the regulations set by a higher level of government. 
 
  In Switzerland, tax sovereignty lies primarily in the Cantons and secondarily in the Confederation 
to such an extent that it is stated in articles 128 to 134 of the 1999 Federal Constitution. The  
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Cantons' freedom to structure and frame their proper tax system and to decide the tax burden is 
limited in three ways:  
 
(i)  Cantons are bound by  three articles in the federal Constitution which allocate indirect taxation 
(VAT in article 130 Cst., and special consumption taxes in article 131 Cst.) exclusively to the 
center and another that forbid  taxes in the form of  tariff  barriers (art. 133 Cst.) which could 
impede the free movement of goods between the Cantons; 
(ii) The Federal Supreme Court's jurisprudence that prohibits, in particular, double taxation or 
unjustified tax rebates (in a very restrictive sense); 
(iii)  Two federal laws on the federal direct tax and on the harmonization of direct taxation by the 
cantons and the communes that were passed on 14 December 1990. These laws  were enforced 
on 1 January 1993, granting however an eight-year transition period to the cantons in order for 
them to adjust their own tax laws accordingly. This period ended on 31 December 2000. Again, 
the impingement on the Cantons' tax sovereignty is limited: harmonization concerns only the 
definition of the tax base B in the formula above) and the list and definitions of the possible 
deductions from the tax base (the Di in the formula) but not the amounts of each of them. 
 
  In this situation of joint taxation, tax sovereignty means that there are 27 laws, with obvious 
problems of competition, coordination and harmonization.  The autonomy of the communes to 
manage their finance varies from one canton to another. In principle, the Cantons regulate the 
financial room for maneuver of their communes by establishing budget principles, uniform 
accounting model, taxation rules and debt limits. Local governments have limited tax sovereignty in 
that they can choose between ability-to-pay taxes and user charges where appropriate. They are 
however tied to the tax system of their Canton. For many taxes, local governments have only  tax  
flexibility: they must apply the cantonal laws and limit their decision to an annual coefficient of 
taxation [Kcommune] in percentage of the Canton's taxes. Local taxation is also compulsory for a 
limited number of taxes.  If a commune chooses to raise user charges and fees, it can also define 
the main components (object of taxation, circle of users and thus payers, computation of the user 
charge base and the tariff), however within the limits set by case law of the Federal Supreme Court 
(KNAPP, 1982: 358-364).  
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  Thus, Switzerland applies a double institutional regime, one for the Cantons (facing  the central 
State) and one for the communes (facing the Cantons). At the cantonal level, the gross tax base and 
the list of deductions (B and Di in the formula above) are identical, but the tax rate schedule and the 
actual amounts of Di are decided freely by each cantonal parliament.  At the local level, the tax 
regime is that of tax flexibility, very close to piggyback; the commune can only decide about the 
necessary coefficient K to balance their budget. At these two levels, the only restriction to 
excessively large differences in direct taxation is the mobility of tax payer units, and tax competition. 
 
 
¾  TEs in Central and Eastern Europe show a wide variety in the degree of fiscal sovereignty of 
subnational entities. In Bulgaria and Macedonia, all parameters of local taxes and user fees are 
determined by national law; in Hungary, Estonia and Romania, these parameters are kept within 
limits. Both approaches risk to erode nominal tax rates in case of high inflation rates. Croatia has a 
system of partial tax sovereignty for local levies and tax flexibility for piggybacking the central 
government's income tax. The Czech Republic and some other countries have introduced a mixed 
system, ensuring full sovereignty for local user charges but severely restricting local freedom for 
"ability-to-pay"-type taxes. Compared to municipal governments, provincial and regional 
governments in Eastern Europe are seldom allowed to influence their tax revenues, and even where 
they have a formal autonomy in budgetary issues (e.g. the voivodships and counties in Poland), they 
are often denied the right to levy own taxes. Instead they receive a share from central tax revenues 
and other grants, and they are eventually free to lease or sell their own properties. If any lesson for 
TEs can be drawn out of the Swiss double regime, it is that tax flexibility can effectively guarantee 
the fiscal autonomy of subcentral government tiers. Nevertheless, the partial tax sovereignty granted 
to the cantons has high administrative and compliance costs, it is not neutral and accounts for 
significant disparities and inequalities in the fiscal treatment of taxpayers. These problems have not 
yet been solved. Tax flexibility, and not partial tax sovereignty, should be therefore the fiscal code 
for TEs. 
 
  The objectives of tax flexibility are: 
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(1) to enable each level of government and each government within a level, to finance its own 
budget independently and according to its own need. This includes the capacity of financing public 
services in response to the preferences of their own electorate (the "choice" model) as well as those 
expenses which correspond to minimum standard (merit) goods and services set by a higher level of 
government (the "agency" model), net of conditional grants. 
 
(2)  to decide redistributive policies in selecting ability-to-pay or benefit taxation. 
 
  However, different tax coefficients create two problems. One is tax competition.  The other one is 
the necessity of an equalization policy (between the center and the Cantons; and within a Canton, 
between the Canton and the communes) because of disparities in the tax burden which often do no 




9  It is clear that, with the indices of cantonal and communal corporate profit tax varying from as low 
as 58 points in Zoug (Table 8, column 4) to 124.1 in Geneva, corresponding to a ratio of 2.32, 
there is room for interjurisdictional competition for attracting business activities. Yet, as ROSSI 
and DAFFLON (2004) demonstrate, tax competition has not helped poorer cantons – for various 
reasons – to attract a substantial volume of economic activities, rather it has provoked a “race to 
the bottom“. In any case, the relative position of the cantons have changed very little over the 
long run, those with higher fiscal capacity being more able to reduce their tax rate or to grant tax 
facilities to new or developing business activities. 
 
9  The general picture is very much contrasted also for the individual  taxpayers. The relative 
burden from income taxation varies from as low as 49.5 points in Zoug to a maximum of 132.4 
points in Jura. That is, taxpayers in the canton Jura pay on average 2.7 times the income tax that 
the average resident in Zoug does, and it is impossible to confirm that a resident of Jura also 
receives 2.7 times as much public service than what is provided in Zoug – on the contrary if one 
                                                 
21  For a presentation and discussion of the actual equalization system between the Confederation and the cantons, see 
(DAFFLON, 2004); between one canton and its communes, see (DAFFLON et al., 2004) which includes bibliographical 
references to various cantonal case studies. For a general European overview of the equalization at the local level,  see 
(FÄRBER G. and OTTER N., 2003).  
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refers to Table 1 and the discussion about the economic position of the cantons. This is probably 
one of the most pernicious problems of Swiss federalism and a high price indeed for tax 
sovereignty. 
 
¾ Tax competition is not yet an issue in TEs, since lower level governments in the countries 
reviewed are normally not authorized to set their own tax rates, or their chosen rates are bound to 
move between legal maximum and minimum limits (an exception from this rule is Croatia). However, 
as soon as the central government introduces tax flexibility so that subnational levels may 
thenceforward determine their own tax coefficients, tax competition will become presumably arise. A 
high interjurisdictional mobility will result in a considerably tough tax competition, which will raise the 
need for horizontal tax coordination. At present, the interjurisdictional mobility of the population is not 
significant, since people are traditionally "rooted to the soil" and the housing market is still 
underdeveloped. However, as markets grow and the costs of relocation decrease, the fiscally 
induced migration of labor may become more intensive. 
 
  Tax competition has its harmful effects in Switzerland, the most important of which is probably 
the overall decline in cantonal and local tax revenues, which results in an excessive reduction of 
public expenditures in policy areas that are relatively little appreciated by private enterprises. 
Through decreased spending on health care, education, housing etc., tax-cutting trends reduce the 
welfare of the citizens. Up to this date, tax competition in Switzerland has probably brought more 
harm than benefit, therefore transition countries should be cautious about adopting the Swiss model 
of tax sovereignty. 
 
 
3.4.3     Direct access to many revenue sources 
  An important characteristic of fiscal autonomy is direct access to many (fiscal) sources. In Table 
5, several finance sources are listed respectively for the federal government, the Cantons and the 
communes.  
 
  Direct access to a number of diversified tax or non-tax sources secures regular annual receipts  
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compared with a situation where a government can rely on one tax only. It enables a better 
distribution of the fiscal burden and avoids exasperating particular categories of taxpayers in case of 
higher fiscal needs. This can also be understood in the view of the low dependence of the Cantons 
on transfer payments from the federal government  and of the communes on transfer payments from 
the Cantons. This is observed in Table 6 from the percentage of the various categories of revenue 
for the three levels of government.  
 
9  In 2001, the net "tax / grant" ratio for the cantons, a measure introduced by KING (1984: 185) 
which measures the proportion of tax revenues to intergovernmental transfers in the budget of 
intermediate level governments, was 1.55 for the totality of the 26 cantons, whereas the "own 
resources / total transfers" ratio was 2.31. These results suggest a relatively large independence 
of cantonal finance on federal transfer payments. The usual interpretation is that the Swiss 
Cantons do not depend much on federal payments and enjoy a fairly high degree of fiscal 
autonomy. However, the individual position of the cantons is widely different: the values of the 
"tax revenues / total transfers" ratio range from 0.32 (Obwald) to 6.07 (Geneva), while the "own 
resources / total transfers" ratio starts at a similar level, 0.56 (Jura), of and reaches its maximum 
at 9.55 (Basle-Town). 
 
9  The communes received only 16 % of their revenues from the Cantons in the form of revenue 
sharing  for 3 % and grants for 13 % (Table 6). Although these proportions were  about 5 points 
lower for the communes in the early eighties (and for the cantons  as well),  the actual figures  do 
not represent a very high degree of financial dependence compared to other OECD countries. 
And in any case, these proportions – viewed from the revenue side – contrast with the degree of 
centralization in public expenditures, which is much higher because the agency role of 
decentralized governments has gained in importance during the last decade compared to the 
"choice" model. 
 
¾  The proportion of shared revenues within local and provincial/regional budgets in Central and 
Eastern Europe varies from 10-15 % in Hungary and 18-25 % in Poland and Slovakia to a third or 
even a half of the local budget in Bulgaria, Slovenia and Estonia. Both Bulgaria and the Czech 
Republic are particular cases insofar as the administration of major taxes is centralized and the  
46 
entire revenue is transferred to subnational governments; however, the latter cannot influence the 
tax rates and the tax base nor introduce any further taxes. In Albania, shared revenues account for 
only 2 to 3 % of the municipal budget (and districts receive no revenue shares at all), while the rest 
is financed through direct grants from the central state. Shared revenues are unknown in Croatia, 
too, but here the bulk of the subnational budget consists of own taxes and surtaxes. A "compromise 
solution" is observed in Macedonia where a mix of central government grants and independent local 
revenues make up 95 % of the local budget, and revenue sharing has never been introduced. As is 
illustrated by the Swiss (and the Croatian) example, subnational dependence on shared revenues 
may be substantially decreased if self-governments gain important access to alternative revenue 
sources such as local taxes and user charges.   
 
¾  As long as the distribution formulas are stable and guaranteed by the constitution or a law that 
cannot be changed every year during the budgeting procedure,  revenue sharing may be a reliable 
source of funding for subnational authorities. In a number of TEs (such as Albania, Romania, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania), revenue shares are fixed neither in the constitution nor in the 
public finance act. Instead, they are revised on an annual basis, depending on the actual political 
and economic pressures faced by the central government (WETZEL, 2001: 27). This obviously 
"kills" the beneficial effect of sharing the revenues over a wide range of different taxes, a policy 
which has been so fruitful in Switzerland. 
 
¾  Finally, flaws in the design of revenue-sharing tend to exacerbate existing horizontal fiscal 
disparities in TEs. The distribution of tax receipts according to the principle of origin (a frequent 
practice in TEs) is particularly responsible in this matter, as it contributes to the conservation of 
existing inequalities in wealth and economic activities across jurisdictions (SLUKHAI, 2002). 
Becoming increasingly aware of this negative side effect, several TEs (like the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Romania) are currently planning to introduce (or have introduced) a fiscal equalization 
component in their revenue-sharing schemes  Though these "experimental" equalization measures 
are often blamed to be unstable, non-transparent and badly targeted, undoubtedly they mark a 
major milestone on the way to a full-fledged fiscal decentralization. 
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3.4.4. Tax  administration 
  Tax administration belongs to the fiscal sovereignty of decentralized government (see 3.4.2 
above): in principle, each level of government and each government within a same level may have 
its own tax administration. However, this is not the case in Switzerland. The federal government has 
no tax administration for the federal direct tax (FDT): the Cantons have a legal obligation to collect 
the FDT on individual income and corporate profits, along with their own taxes. They also participate 
in managing the federal withholding tax and stamps duties. However, since there are 26 cantonal 
tax laws and as many tax administrations and no tutelage of  the federal government over State and 
local tax administration, there exist 26 ways of managing cantonal taxes and the FDT. In order to 
gain economies of scale in the tax administration and coherence in the tax practice, many formulas 
exist for cooperation between the three tiers of government. Nevertheless, the present system of 
managing and collecting direct taxes being far from optimal, propositions and arguments are raised 
from time to time in the favor a "flat rate" direct tax that would circumvent these difficulties. 
 
  In addition, since the powers of the State tax administrations are limited to the territorial area of 
the State to which they belong, whereas economic activities may spill over cantonal limits, a 
decentralized tax administration creates problems and conflicts. These have been solved in the first 
place by negotiations between the Cantons, eventually (and more often) through the jurisprudence 
of the Federal Supreme Court. Secondly, a federal law on the harmonization of cantonal direct 
taxation has been enforced on 1 January 1993 to introduce some order in the Cantons' taxation for 
neutrality and equity reasons. Since 1 January 2001, the cantons have had to adapt their own tax 
legislation to a common unique framework, where B and Di in the taxation formula are defined by 
the center, but the maximum amount of each Di and "t" are left to the individual cantons to decide. 
 
  At the local level, no such difficulties exist. In most cases, the communes can only decide annual 
tax coefficients for the various accessible tax sources, but have no access to defining the kind of tax 
they raise, nor its calculation or its rate schedule: it is a "take it or leave it" situation. In many 
cantons, the communes can contract with the cantonal tax administration to collect communal 
taxes.
22 
                                                 
22  In the Canton of Fribourg, the cost for a commune is 1.5
 0/0 of the net tax revenues. The cantonal tax administration  
49 
3.4.5. Tax coordination 
 
Vertical coordination 
  Vertical coordination concerns the assignment of tax authority to the various levels of 
government. It should be clear which jurisdiction is entitled to tax which items from which taxpayer. 
Attention must be given to the geographical distribution of tax yield. A good tax under subcentral 
authorities should have a tax base that is widely and evenly distributed throughout the country 
(KING, 1984: 210-211). In addition, one can say that the general objectives of vertical tax 
coordination: 
 
(i)  stable and predictable revenue sources at the three levels;  
(ii)   high proportion of own resources in total cantonal and communal revenues; 
(iii) sufficient tax room at the cantonal and communal levels, and 
(iv)   efficient decentralized taxation and accountability. 
 
  These conditions are fulfilled in the Swiss case. Referring to Table 7, one can also add that in 
Switzerland vertical coordination is obtained: 
 
9  Partly through the attribution of exclusive tax sources to each level of government according to 
the doctrine of  the separation of sources. This is clear for consumption and expenditure taxes 
where there is no overlapping of the tax bases between the Confederation, the Cantons and the 
communes. 
 
9  On the other hand, for "direct" taxation, personal income and corporate profits
23 are jointly taxed 
at the three levels. The vertical  apportionment between the three levels of government is rather 
complex and often left implicit. It is obtained in two ways: a moderate taxation at each level so 
that no single government exhausts the entire tax capacity; and, the assessment of priority, first 
to the Cantons, then to the communes and lastly to the Confederation.  It has been traditionally 
admitted for direct taxation that the federal share should not exceed one fourth of the total (Table 
                                                                                                                                               
collects communal taxes on the basis of the communes' own coefficient K and acts for the commune in all aspects of tax 
litigation. The tax proceeds are paid to the commune on a monthly base.  
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8). Minimum taxable income at the federal level should be higher than in the Cantons and the tax 
rate schedule more progressive. Yet, the Cantons receive back some 30 % of the federal direct 
tax (FDT) in the form of revenue sharing, of which 13 % is affected to inter-cantonal fiscal 
equalization. 
 
9  Note also that Switzerland has a particular characteristic: vertical tax coordination is written in the 
federal Constitution. Following art. 196 al. 13 of the transitory provisions of the 1999 Cst., the  
FDT may be levied until the end of 2006 only. The consequence is that, some years before this  
limit, the federal government must justify the further necessity of levying a direct tax at the central 
level in concurrence with the Cantons and the communes, and explain its motives.
24 The 
decision to continue to levy a FDT necessitates the double majority of voters and Cantons, which 
is a powerful mean for the Cantons to obtain compensatory advantages, notably in the 
equalization policy. 
 
9  With the enforcement of the value-added tax (VAT) on 1 January 1995, and with it, the extension 
of expenditure taxation to services, the most orthodox federalists claim that the joint attribution of 
direct taxation to the Confederation and the Cantons should end. The argument is that the 
overall burden of indirect (consumption) taxes is still lower in Switzerland than in most other 
European countries. This gives a freedom of maneuver which should be used  to reduce the 
direct tax burden which, combined to social security contributions, is higher than average. For 
some,  there should be a crystal-clear order in taxation under the slogan: "VAT is federal / direct 
taxation is cantonal". Opponents argue that the abolition of the FDT will set back  income 
redistribution through ability-to-pay taxation because the tax rate progressiveness of the FDT is 
higher than in any canton. In addition, the abolition would create difficulty in the federal-cantonal 
equalization policy. 
 
9 Vertical coordination between the Cantons and their communes is secured because, as 
explained in section 3.4.2, local governments have no sovereignty on these matters, but only tax 
                                                                                                                                               
23  The federal direct tax on business capital has been suppressed by the law of October 10, 1997, from 1998 onwards. 
24 On December  9, 2002, the Federal Council has published a message concerning the "New Fiscal Regime 2007" in which 
it proposes to abolish any existing temporal limitation on the collection of the FDT and the value-added tax (see Feuille 
fédérale No. 8, 4 mars 2003, p. 1390). In March 2004, both chambers of the Parliament approved the proposal. The final  
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flexibility. The most debated question is whether local governments can taper at this source in 
priority, to the detriment of the cantonal tiers. The usual solution is that communal tax coefficients 
are subject to an upper limit fixed in the cantonal law in proportion to cantonal taxes (for 




  Horizontal coordination serves to apportion tax competencies and the tax yields among the 
jurisdictions at the same level where the tax base has its origin in several communes or cantons. In 
Switzerland, this has been obtained through the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court. Two 
objectives have been pursued: avoidance of double taxation, and, preventing that  taxpayers with 
taxable activities in more than one jurisdiction avoid the progressiveness of the tax rate schedules 
through geographical splitting of the tax base. Although the technical rules are rather intricate 
(DAFFLON, 1986: 32-36), horizontal coordination applies itself along the following general 
guidelines: 
-  the income tax is entirely paid in the canton and the communes of residence;
25 
-  any income obtained in other jurisdictions is assessed in the jurisdiction of residence according 
to the rules of the jurisdiction of residence (and not the rule of the jurisdiction where the income 
has been gained); 
-  immovable property is taxed in the jurisdiction where it exists and according to "in situ" rules; 
-  when corporate business takes place in several jurisdictions, the yields of the profit and capital 
taxes are distributed between those jurisdictions according to financially measurable components 
of  the  activity (for example: turnover, the volume of sales, total insurance premiums for 
insurance companies). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
decision will be taken by the voters  in an obligatory referendum. 
25  This has been confirmed by the Federal Supreme Court early in 1999 in a dispute between the cantons of Geneva and 
Vaud concerning commuters working in Geneva but resident in Vaud who had received income tax assignment from the 
canton of Geneva (see the Order of the 1st Public Law Court  of October 27, 1999, Canton Vaud v. the Republic and Canton 
of Geneva: Official Bulletin of the Federal Supreme Court, 125 I, p. 458-474).  
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4.   BUDGET    POLICY   
 
  The Swiss Cantons have their own Constitutions,  independent power over their budgets and 
their own financial resources and, above all, they have the power of taxation. Cantonal autonomy in 
the area of fiscal policy contrasts with the budget principles and  the rules of taxation to which 
member States in other federations are subject. Legislative authorities at the federal level, in the 26 
Cantons and in every single municipality must decide the budget (current + capital) before the 
beginning of the year and, of course, keep books recording revenues and expenditures. Since the 
mid 1980s, budget and bookkeeping techniques have been  harmonized. Annual budgets as such 
do not give a legal base for expenditures and taxation. Each item in the current as well as in the 
capital budgets must be founded on particular laws that have been debated separately in parliament 
and enforced prior to the budget discussion.  
 
The federal Constitution does not impose budget principles on the Cantons. There is no federal 
constraint on deficit financing, except that all tiers of government have no access to borrowing from 
the Central Bank. The main external limitation on budgetary sovereignty of the Cantons is 
intrinsically competition with other cantons: if a canton pursues an inefficient fiscal policy with a poor 
cost-benefit relationship, it will price itself out of the market. Individuals and firms will move "à la 
Tiebout" to another canton ("exit", in Hirschman's terminology); or the voters or some groups of 
them will  use initiatives and referenda in order to obtain a modification of the "public goods / tax" 
mix in comparison to that of other cantons ("voice"). Competition is even more important at the local 
level, particularly between communes in the same urban agglomeration. 
 
 
4.1. Budget    orthodoxy 
The fairly extensive autonomy of cantonal and local governments for their finance is not unlimited. 
The are also internal limitations in cantonal Constitutions or laws. Two rules are generally 
respected, at the level of the Cantons in their own financial laws, and in the communes under 
cantonal supervision  (DAFFLON, 2002a).   
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9  The first rule is concerned with the requirement of a more or less balanced budget for providing 
goods and services. Due to financial regulation, for most local and cantonal governments it is 
quite difficult to run or to accumulate deficits in their (current) budgets. If a large budget deficit 
occurs, taxation would have to be increased. In many cantons, the amortization must not only be 
recorded in the book, but also correspond to an effective installment of the loans. At the 
communal level, if a local authority would not follow this rule, the cantonal government might 
decide to raise the annual coefficient of taxation in place of the commune.
26 In general, the 
Cantons apply the "golden rule": local current revenues net of current expenditures are 
sufficient to serve the debt interest and bear the running costs of past and new investments. 
Whether this rule includes the effective annual reimbursement of the debt on a pay-as-you-use 
basis (for capital expenditures financed by borrowing) varies from one canton to another. This 
also necessitates a clear line between current and capital expenditures and, of course, 
separation of the current from the capital budget. Again, the definition is not identical from canton 
to canton: in particular with regard to the possibility (i) to transform capital expenditures into 
current outlays through leasing contracts to shortcut limitation, if any, or (ii) through outsourcing 
of certain expenditures to external budgets not accounted for by the public sector. 
9 The second rule concerns borrowing and debt limitation. Public debt is allowed in many 
cantons only for financing capital  expenditures, and if the local and/or cantonal government has 
the financial capacity to pay the interest and amortization of the debt out of its current budget. 
The rates of amortization are fixed according to the kind of investment and its possible length of 
use (pay-as-you-use finance). This of course requires a distinction between the current budget, 
which must be balanced, and the capital budget, which can be financed by borrowing. 
 
  These two more or less strict requirements express  the principle of accountability or budgetary 
responsibility. They must be viewed in the perspective of the cantonal and communal financial 
                                                 
26  For example, in September 1994, the State Council (the executive government) of canton Berne imposed on the 
commune of Berne (the capital city of the Canton and  also the federal city)  an increase of the tax coefficient from a multiple 
of  2.2 to 2.4 of the cantonal direct taxes levied in the commune.  The reason was that the electorate of the commune had 
rejected for the third time the 1994 budget, which presented a deficit and required for balance an increase of taxation. In 
Fribourg, the Canton controls on a yearly basis the books and the public debt of the communes. It intervenes if the current 
account is not balanced or if amortization of the debt and the effective reimbursement of loans are not sufficient according to 
legal minimum rates. Cantonal intervention takes several forms, but it can go so far as to impose a higher tax coefficient to 
the commune at fault in order to restore its financial situation. 
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autonomy and a large access to own revenue sources as described above. On the one hand, 
cantonal and local governments have a fairly large (though diminishing) amount of autonomy to 
decide and offer public services, and direct access to taxation. On the other hand, it is expected that 
these governments will act in a responsible way and will finance without excess borrowing what they 
are asked to produce, either by law ("agency") or in response to their electorate's own demands 
("choice"). This is definitely a classical approach to fiscal federalism (TOLLISON and WAGNER, 
1986). The interests of the public debt of the cantons in 2001 represented on average 4 % of total 
cantonal outlays; and 6 % for the communes (Table 4). 
 
Finally, there is growing evidence for the effectiveness of financial referenda in restraining the size 
of the public sector, on the one hand, and in reinforcing budget discipline, on the other (see section 
2.3). 
 
¾  In Central and Eastern Europe, borrowing by subnational governments is still a relatively new 
phenomenon, and regulations and practices vary significantly across the region (SWIANIEWICZ, 
2004). Several countries (such as Estonia, Slovakia and Romania) apply the "golden rule", 
nevertheless, as capital and current budgets are usually not separated, the implementation of this 
rule is rather difficult to control. In countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, there is no 
prohibition on borrowing for operational purposes, yet most of the contracted loans serve capital 
investments. Maximum limits on borrowing and debt service have been introduced in several – but 
not all – TEs. Despite the high diversity of existing rules, the borrowing practice of Eastern European 
subnational governments is generally prudent, which is also reflected in the relatively modest 
average share of debt revenues in the local and regional budgets. Budget discipline and 
accountability have recently become core issues in the Eastern European local public finance, 
particularly because the perspective of a future accession to the euro zone compels the government 
sector to reduce public debt and deficit levels. Given the need for a continuous development of 
public infrastructures, there is a clear scope for a wider use of borrowing at decentralized levels. 
This, however, requires not only a well-developed credit market but also stable rules on borrowing 
and debt service, and predictable revenue sources for subnational governments. Better 
implementation and monitoring, as well as improved information systems are only a few challenges 
for the years to come. Examples of "best practice" can be learnt not only from Switzerland, but from  
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other European countries as well (DAFFLON, 2002a). 
 
4.2. Macroeconomic  policy 
  The decentralization of government functions raises problems for macroeconomic control at the 
national level. This is because cantonal and communal accountability involves the access to own 
revenue sources together with the right of the Cantons and the communes to borrow. Uncontrolled 
access to capital markets and mismanagement of the budgets by cantonal and local government 
could jeopardize the efforts, if any, to stabilize the economy. For this reason, so the textbook 
argument runs, central government ought to have some monitoring or control power. However, one 
must distinguish whether the assignment of responsibilities and revenues to the cantonal and 
communal tiers is in balance and regular, or volatile and subject to strong cyclical variation. In the 
first case, control can be restricted to the golden rule, that borrowing is allowed only for 
infrastructures, and the time-path of capital investment. In the second case, borrowing may be 
needed not only for investment, but also to compensate for cyclical variation in the budget (higher 
social assistance expenditures, with less revenue, in downwards cyclical turn). 
 
  Nevertheless, the actual decentralized public finance may be somewhat distant from the textbook 
theory. Stabilizing tax adjustments is a mere conjecture in the Swiss situation: the electorate has to 
vote the tax law at the cantonal level, or the tax coefficient at the local level: while it may accept 
variation in taxation, whether to restore a balanced current budget or for new investments, it is 
unlikely to do so just for macroeconomic reasons. In addition, the time path required for such a 
decision is probably foreign to upward or downward changes in the macroeconomic trend.  
 
  On the side of public expenditures, the economic classification in Table 9 gives an interesting 
first insight into the capacity of the center to manage macroeconomic policy. At the federal level, 
current and capital grants account for 52 %  (45 + 7) of total expenditures, whereas revenue 
sharing, written in the Constitution, amounts to 12 %. Expenditures for personnel and interest 
payment have a share of 11 % and 7 % respectively. This means that  about 82 % of the total 
budget is spent on expenditure categories that are very difficult, if not impossible, to modify in the 
short term for macroeconomic purposes. Consumption (9 %) and own investments (2 %) reach 




  At the cantonal level, the picture is not much better: here, too, expenditure categories that are 
rigid on the short term are personnel (37 %), debt interest (4 %), revenue sharing (2 %), and grants-
in-aid in the current and capital accounts (34 + 3 %), in total 81 % of cantonal public expenditures. 
As a consequence, merely one fifth of the total cantonal public expenditures (constituting the 
categories of “consumption” and “own investment”) can be swiftly adapted to stabilization policy 
objectives – with the additional restriction on single investments discussed below. 
  
  Not surprisingly, one finds that the communes spend much more on consumption (21 %) and 
investment (12 %) than the other government tiers: it amounts to roughly 33 % of their total 
expenditures. This suggests that, in quantitative terms, local governments would be the most 
suitable tier to implement macroeconomic policy. However, local governments are small open 
economies not interested in engaging themselves in such policies for fear of spillover effects.  
 
  The actual distribution of expenditure responsibilities between the three layers of government in 
Switzerland, and the very nature of these outlays, do not mean that any macroeconomic policy 
through fiscal instruments is impossible, at least from a conceptual point of view. Yet, because of the 
difficulty to act on personnel expenditures and transfers in the short term, one must recognize that 
any macroeconomic policy cannot be driven by and at the center only. It requires some form of 
consensus between the three government tiers and vertical cooperation. This is not an easy matter 
because (twenty-six) regional and (around 2880) local interests are potentially divergent. In 
particular, more and more investment projects require important financial resources and long term 
planning: when such a project is ready to be voted, it is doubtful whether any government will accept 
to postpone it for macroeconomic reason. And inversely, it is not so easy to accelerate a project for 
macroeconomic reason without taking the time to present a detailed investment program or rushing 
it through the parliamentary process not respecting democratic procedure. A canton or a commune 
may be very reluctant to abandon or postpone an investment for the sake of a central coordinated 
macroeconomic policy. This explains also why the fiscal and budget policy plays only a limited role 
in stabilization (AYRTON, 2002), compared to the position of the monetary authorities through the 
Swiss National Bank.  
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¾  At present, subcentral government tiers in TEs are not strong enough to put through their 
individual interests against the macroeconomic policy efforts of the center. Local investment and 
consumption decisions seldom interfere with the cyclical movements in central macroeconomic 
policy. This means that during recession, the center can easily gear the economy through 
stimulating local consumption and investment, whereas in periods of economic expansion, 
measures for reducing the aggregate demand generally do not clash with any expansionary efforts 
of subnational governments. However, as decentralization proceeds, the budgetary autonomy of 
subnational authorities will be expanded, and the central governments' efficiency in macroeconomic 
management may be reduced. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
  Although the government structure and hence the intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
Switzerland are quite different from what can be found in the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Switzerland still sets a valuable example in various domains of fiscal federalism. 
Remarkable similarities between Switzerland and Eastern Europe can be observed in the degree of 
fragmentation of the territorial structure and in the importance of horizontal disparities. By way of 
conclusion, we briefly formulate 12 lessons that TEs may draw from the Swiss experience: 
 
1.  Enlarging the scope for direct democracy (an increase in the number of referenda, the 
introduction of fiscal policy issues on the agenda etc.) is likely to inspire citizens' trust and 
interest in local politics. Direct participation in policy-making will encourage local economic 
development and enhance social and individual welfare. 
2.  In consideration of the growing economic pressure on national budgets (especially due to the 
Maastricht requirements of convergence with the euro-zone), local authorities should not count 
on bailout grants being continuously paid by the central government in the long term. Problems 
of inefficiency in local public service provision should instead be solved through inter-communal 
cooperation. 
3.  Through spontaneous cooperation based on mutual economic interests, small and financially  
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weak municipalities can effectively fend off any potential central government intervention aimed 
at the withdrawal of certain local expenditure competences. 
4.  The Swiss case provides evidence that policies aiming at a higher degree of fiscal devolution 
are not necessarily frustrated by extreme interregional disparities. Various systems of 
cooperation between government units and the attenuation of excessive disparities through 
well-designed fiscal equalization schemes may compensate for the difficulties arising from a 
widely heterogeneous structure of government. 
5.  An in-depth analysis of the relative position of democratically elected governments and 
bureaucratic/administrative authorities at the intermediate level is a pre-requisite for sound 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in every TE. Even if the elected regional bodies in Central and 
Eastern Europe are not supposed to enjoy similarly wide autonomy as the Cantons in 
Switzerland, a clear delineation of their competences vis-à-vis the central government and its 
territorial units is indispensable. 
6.  Once regions are empowered to assume considerable expenditure and revenue autonomy, they 
may become an important counterweight to central government and start playing a significant 
role in the socio-economic development of the country. 
7.  The Swiss example shows that expenditure-sharing does not affect the efficiency of revenue 
assignment as long as the law provides for a clear demarcation of competences between 
government tiers to avoid inefficient duplications. 
8.  The principle of subsidiarity can best be safeguarded when subnational competences are 
anchored either in the constitution or in a law that requires a 2/3 majority for being amended, 
and if local and regional units have sufficient access to financial resources. 
9.  The Swiss double regime of cantonal and local taxation suggests that tax flexibility can 
effectively guarantee the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. In contrast, the partial tax 
sovereignty of the Cantons has high administrative and compliance costs; it is not neutral and 
may lead to severe inequalities between taxpayers. 
10. However, once overall tax flexibility is introduced for the subnational government tiers in TEs, 
inter-jurisdictional tax competition is likely to emerge. Central governments will need to 
formulate reasonable policies for horizontal tax coordination in order to offset potentially harmful  
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competition, since – as the Swiss example demonstrates – the downward spiral of tax rates may 
lead to a drop in subnational government expenditures and thus reduce the overall welfare of 
citizens.  
11. With regard to the fiscal discipline at the lower levels, the Swiss case shows that there is no 
need for a central administrative control on local borrowing. However, it is essential to edict 
clear rules and sanctions of non-compliance, and to implement them rigorously. In Switzerland, 
the combination of a golden rule with direct democratic instruments has proven to be successful 
–in the cantons where it is implemented - in limiting the size of government as well as in 
rationalizing collective decisions and enhancing the efficiency of public investments by means of 
a democratic debate.  
12. Finally, the transition from a deconcentrated socialist system of governance to genuine 
devolution of powers makes it relatively difficult for the center to coordinate macroeconomic 
policy at the national level. The major challenge is to find out to what extent the central 
government may interfere with the affairs of subcentral authorities without hurting the autonomy 
of the latter. Both macroeconomic stabilization instruments as well as the budgetary 
coordination between government tiers need to find their proper limits. In Switzerland, the 
federal government has abandoned the use of fiscal instruments in macroeconomic policy: 
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Table 1a: Some general indicators of the Swiss Cantons, 2001  
 
Source: "Annuaire statistique de la Suisse 2003", OFS, Berne (columns 2-8); "Finances publiques 
en Suisse 2001" 
Population 





















1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Zoug 11 239  100.9  422  7,191  71,733  22.3 
Basle-Town 3  37  186.7  5,046  11,978  63,002  14.6 
Zurich 171 1,729  1228.6  711  72,504  58,540  20.8 
Geneva 45  282  414.3  1,469 20,763  49,969  1.3 
Nidwald 11  276 38.6  140  1,989  53,189  34.1 
Basle-Land 86  518  261.4  505  13,415  51,853  28.1 
Schaffhouse 34  299  73.4  245  3,593  49,322 27.4 
Argovie 232  1,404  550.9  392  26,655  48,808  23.3 
Schwyz 30  908  131.4  145  6,235  47,862  38.4 
Vaud 384  3,212  626.2  195 30,272  47,748  21.7 
Thurgovie 80  991  228.2 230  9,639  42,357  22.0 
Soleure 126  791  245.5  310  10,425  42,927  16.8 
Saint-Gall 90  2,026 452.6 223  19,356  42,926  23.1 
Glaris 29  685  38.3  56  1,796  47,249  5.8 
Tessin   245  2,812  311.9  111  11,181  36,665  12.0 
Grisons 212  7,105  185.7  26  7,782  41,339  9.8 
Lucerne 107  1,494  350.6  235  14,319  41,136  23.9 
Uri 20  1,077  35  32  1,468  42,966  37.4 
Berne 400 5,959  947.1  159 38,796  40,697  12.3 
Appenzell 
Rh.-Ext. 20  243 53.2  219  2,273  42,934  25.8 
Appenzell 
Rh.-Int. 6  173  15  87  588 39,940  26.6 
Neuchâtel 62  803  166.5 207  6,645  39,858  10.6 
Fribourg 226  1,671  239.1  143  9,055  37,748  16.4 
Obwald 7  491  32.7  67  1,151  35,427  9.0 
Jura 83 839  69.1  82 2,263  33,616  6.4 
Valais 160 5,225  278.2  53  9,692  35,309  10.1 
Switzerland 2880  41,289  7261.1  176  341,024  46,970 17.6  
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Table 1b: Some general indicators of the Swiss Cantons, 2001 
  Public finance in the Cantons 





size         




  9  10  11 = (10)-(9)  12 = (9):(6)  13 = (9):(4) 
Zoug 801,478  848,188  46,710  11.15  7,943 
Basle-Town 3,951,705  4,010,686  58,981  32.99  21,166 
Zurich 9,806,316  10,557,020  750,704  13.53  7,982 
Geneva 6,760,559  6,611,547  -149,012  32.56 16,318 
Nidwald 303,288  314,822  11,534  15.25 7,857 
Basle-Land 2,206,120 2,209,127  3,007  16.45  8,440 
Schaffhouse 537,041  561,180  24,139  14.95  7,317 
Argovie 3,418,568  3,516,202  97,634 12.83  6,205 
Schwyz 696,032  756,413  60,381 11.16 5,297 
Vaud 6,039,208  6,169,875  130,667  19.95  9,644 
Thurgovie 1,369,366  1,468,142  98,776  14.21  6,001 
Soleure 1,516,856  1,538,637  21,781 14.55 6,179 
Saint-Gall 3,292,982  3,465,658  172,676  17.01  7,276 
Glaris 345,854  328,772  -17,082  19.26  9,030 
Tessin   2,526,297  2,604,943  78,646  22.59  8,100 
Grisons 1,787,282  1,803,620  16,338 22.97 9,625 
Lucerne 2,497,665  2,692,765  195,100  17.44 7,124 
Uri 446,238  454,333  8,095  30.40  12,750 
Berne 7,912,635  7,698,561  -214,074  20.40  8,355 
Appenzell Rh.-
Ext. 356,556  369,984  13,428  15.69  6,702 
Appenzell Rh.-
Int. 112,976  109,365  -3,611  19.21  7,532 
Neuchâtel 1,583,524  1,577,809 -5,715  23.83  9,511 
Fribourg 2,091,144  2,101,742  10,598  23.09 8,746 
Obwald 269,580  278,191  8,611  23.42  8,244 
Jura 747,343  742,905  -4,438  33.02  10,815 
Valais 2,558,289  2,400,310  -157,979  26.40  9,196 
Switzerland 63,934,902 65,190,797  1,255,895  18.75  8,805 
 
Source: A.F.F., Berne, 2003 (columns 9-10): 65, 67, 93, 95; La Vie économique, Revue de 
politique économique, Berne, 3-2004:108-109 
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Table 1c: Some general indicators of the Swiss Cantons, 2001 
  Public finance in the communes 





sector size  





  14  15  16 = (15)-(14) 17= (14):(6) 18 = (14):(4) 
Zoug 632,777  611,690  -21,087  8.80  6,271 
Basle-Town 93,747  97,075  3,328  0.78  502 
Zurich 9,677,555  10,348,272  670,717  13.35  7,877 
Geneva 1,447,996  1,593,229  145,233  6.97  3,495 
Nidwald 155,504  155,289  -215  7.82 4,029 
Basle-Land 991,313  985,523  -5,790  7.39  3,792 
Schaffhouse 382,148  382,443  295  10.64  5,206 
Argovie 2,320,604  2,370,864  50,260  8.71  4,212 
Schwyz 676,318  694,022  17,704  10.85  5,147 
Vaud 3,864,335  4,008,278  143,943  12.77  6,171 
Thurgovie 1,032,204  1,063,767  31,563  10.71 4,523 
Soleure 1,218,075  1,222,211  4,136 11.68  4,962 
Saint-Gall 2,547,667  2,640,314  92,647  13.16 5,629 
Glaris 228,399  224,486  -3,913  12.72  5,963 
Tessin   1,696,984  1,756,715  59,731  15.18  5,441 
Grisons 1,384,129  1,360,739  -23,390  17.79  7,454 
Lucerne 1,934,316  1,948,160  13,844  13.51  5,517 
Uri 120,061  125,368  5,307  8.18  3,430 
Berne 6,365,795  6,593,738  227,943  16.41  6,721 
Appenzell Rh.-
Ext. 244,954  247,613  2,659  10.78  4,604 
Appenzell Rh.-
Int. 39,255  41,485  2,230  6.68  2,617 
Neuchâtel 1,376,516  1,345,846 -30,670 20.72 8,267 
Fribourg 1,079,495  1,025,716  -53,779  11.92  4,515 
Obwald 142,808  149,719  6,911  12.41  4,367 
Jura 446,362  437,890  -8,472  19.72  6,460 
Valais 1,609,692  1,602,710  -6,982  16.61  5,786 
Switzerland 41,709,009 43,033,162  1,324,153 12.23  5,744 
 
Source: "Finances publiques en Suisse 2001"; A.F.F., Berne, 2003 (columns 14-15): 65, 67, 93, 95; 
La Vie économique, Revue de politique économique, Berne, 3-2004:108-109 
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1996/97   








    (x 1.5) 
Expenditure 
requirements 





1 2  3  4  5  6  7 
Zurich 125.15  118.22  126.56  108.95  120.95  157 
Berne 88.5  83.25  84.99  94.18  87.53  66 
Lucerne 88.82  87.75  83.36  102.09  89.62  72 
Uri 86.81  113.89  81.17  73.61  87.89  67 
Schwyz 97.49  118.71  94.2  85.49  98.35  96 
Obwald 77.47  89.06  70.99  76.76  77.7  40 
Nidwald 115.81  128.85  105.77  83.38  108.92  124 
Tessin 84.06  96.67  100.53  85.96  91.9  78 
Zoug 158.32  142.23  161.02  96.63  143.57  218 
Fribourg 84.63  70  78.09  97  82.21  52 
Thurgovie 86.31  102.42  89.4  110.44  95.28  87 
Bâle-Ville 141  89.93  129.6  111.1  121.39  158 
Bâle-Campagne 107.22 107.21 109.39  105.52  107.53 120 
Schaffhouse 102.29  102.93  95.53  111.06  102.14  106 
Appenzell Rh.-Ext.  80.79  95.45  83.43  82.25  84.81  59 
Appenzell Rh.-Int.  83.36  105.49  82.49  71.39  85.13  60 
Saint-Gall 86.48  101.13  91.74  98.58  93.41  82 
Grisons 87.12  100.89  101.52  70  90.77  75 
Argovie 98.8  105.99  90.33  110.46  100.03  100 
Soleure 91.51  102.51  88.46  103.52  95.2  87 
Glaris 113.65  90.98  80.86  77.3  92.01  78 
Vaud 98.77  87.8  98.47  106.17  97.96  95 
Valais 74.23  71.99  70  81.19  73.9  30 
Neuchâtel 87.53  76.48  84.35  88.65  84.59  58 
Geneva 112.65  85.49  126.35  111.1  111.02  130 
Jura 70  73.41  72.27  84.98  74.36  31 
Switzerland 100  100 100 100  100  100 
Max/min ratio  1.11  1.61  1.75  1.41  1.63  5.06 
Sources:  Finances publiques en Suisse 2001, A.F.F., Berne: 76; Ordonnance du 17 novembre 
1999 fixant la capacité financière des cantons pour les années 2000 et 2001, RS 613.11 
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Table 3: Growth of the public sector 1970-2001, in millions SFr. 







































rate   
 1990-
2001
1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8 9 10 11  12  13  14 15  16 
Confederation  7,834 32.36 17,532 31.34 1.24 31,616 30.70 0.80 48,208 32.36 0.52 5.15 51,136 32.62 0.62 
Cantons  9,533 39.38 21,926 39.20 1.30 41,116 39.93 0.88 60,151 40.38 0.46 5.31 63,935 40.78 0.55 
Communes  6,840 28.26 16,476 29.46 1.41 30,245 29.37 0.84 40,599 27.26 0.34 4.94 41,709 26.60 0.38 
Total*  24,207 100.00 55,934 100.00 1.31 102,977 100.00 0.84 148,958 100.00 0.45 5.15 156,780 100.00 0.52 
Total without 
double 
accounting  20,285    47,240        86,614        123,612                  
GDP  90,558    180,305       327,584       415,529          422,485      
% GDP  22.4     26.2        26.4        29.7           31.3       
Source: "Finances publiques en Suisse 2001", A.F.F., Berne, 2003: 2-3. *Data not consolidated; without social security expenditures 
 
Notes: Columns 2, 4, 7, 10, 14: Public expenditures, in millions of Swiss francs (SFr); Columns 3, 5, 8, 11, 15: Share (%) of each level of government in total public 









Table 4: Public expenditures, 2001 
Public expenditures in 1000 SFr 
Expenditure shares between gov.
tiers (%) 
Expenditure function  Confederation Cantons  communes total  Confederation  Cantonscommunes
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Administration 1,912,934  3,440,765  3,691,204  9,044,903  21.15 38.04  40.81 
Public order  632,111  5,009,173  1,897,310  7,538,594  8.38 66.45  25.17 
. police  167,482  2,331,340  780,679  3,279,501  5.11 71.09  23.80 
. justice  95,699  1,053,602  41,655  1,190,956  8.04 88.47  3.50 
. fire defense  0  64,935  495,728  560,663  0.00 11.58  88.42 
. other  368,930  1,559,296  579,248  2,507,474  14.71 62.19  23.10 
National defense  4,956,846  257,882  238,619  5,453,347  90.90 4.73  4.38 
. army  4,870,197  167,401  56,868  5,094,466  95.60 3.29  1.12 
. civil defense  86,649  90,481  181,751  358,881  24.14 25.21  50.64 
Foreign Affairs  2,691,469  0  0  2,691,469  100.00 0.00  0.00 
Education 3,650,226  15,598,801 9,662,846  28,911,873  12.63 53.95  33.42 
. kindergarten  0  386,690  650,676  1,037,366  0.00 37.28  62.72 
. public schools  15,951  5,708,130  7,579,345  13,303,426  0.12 42.91  56.97 
. special schools  0  610,695  597,957  1,208,652  0.00 50.53  49.47 
. professional 
teaching centers  455,434  2,787,634  664,699  3,907,767  11.65 71.34  17.01 
. colleges  11,932  1,900,809  88,286  2,001,027  0.60 94.99  4.41 
. higher technical 
schools 18,973  229,176  3,899  252,048  7.53 90.93  1.55 
. universities, 
research 2,392,798  3,624,024  19,473  6,036,295  39.64 60.04  0.32 
. others  755,138  351,643  58,511  1,165,292  64.80 30.18  5.02 
Culture, leisure and 
sports 780,352  1,297,457  2,205,995  4,283,804  18.22 30.29  51.50 
. culture  472,976  654,559  838,387  1,965,922  24.06 33.30  42.65 
. sports  136,261  130,967  761,753  1,028,981  13.24 12.73  74.03 
. others  171,115  511,931  605,855  1,288,901  13.28 39.72  47.01 
Health 227,653  11,025,989 7,741,352  18,994,994  1.20 58.05  40.75 
. hospitals  9,299  8,436,604  5,629,002  14,074,905  0.07 59.94  39.99 
. others  218,354  2,589,385  2,112,350  4,920,089  4.44 52.63  42.93 
Social Affairs, 
solidarity 12,529,165  11,315,825 5,885,297  29,730,287  42.14 38.06  19.80 
. old-age pensions  4,833,915  1,121,513  210,351  6,165,779  78.40 18.19  3.41 
. invalidity insurance  3,575,494  1,181,558  172,751  4,929,803  72.53 23.97  3.50 
. health insurance  1,918,374  3,032,617  428,620  5,379,611  35.66 56.37  7.97 
. other social  
insurances 931,752  2,190,717  886,585  4,009,054  23.24 54.64  22.11 
. social housing  242,076  179,860  48,097  470,033  51.50 38.27  10.23 
. homes for old age 
pensioners 0 37,581  927,007  964,588  0.00 3.90  96.10 
. individual social aid  1,027,554  2,685,624  2,596,472  6,309,650  16.29 42.56  41.15 
. others  0  886,355  615,414  1,501,769  0.00 59.02  40.98 
Transportation and 
roads 8,680,481  6,045,738  3,018,192  17,744,411  48.92 34.07  17.01 
. roads  2,897,050  4,714,058  2,432,815  10,043,923  28.84 46.93  24.22 
. railways  3,324,923  0  0  3,324,923  100.00 0.00  0.00 
. regional public 
transportation 913,251  1,267,366  564,353  2,744,970  33.27 46.17  20.56 
. others  1,545,257  64,314  21,024  1,630,595  94.77 3.94  1.29 
Environment 812,866  1,527,093  3,603,008  5,942,967  13.68 25.70  60.63 
. water  0  42,023  279,982  322,005  0.00 13.05  86.95  
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. sewage and water 
purification 176,202  511,970  1,547,783  2,235,955  7.88 22.90  69.22 
. garbage collection 
and disposal  45,996  172,941  913,095  1,132,032  4.06 15.28  80.66 
. land planning, 
zoning 370,842  549,542  513,173  1,433,557  25.87 38.33  35.80 
. others  219,826  250,617  348,975  819,418  26.83 30.58  42.59 
Economy 4,787,923  4,490,744 820,160  10,098,827  47.41 44.47  8.12 
. agriculture  3,962,176  2,930,530  98,725  6,991,431  56.67 41.92  1.41 
. forestry  255,657  494,608  353,756  1,104,021  23.16 44.80  32.04 
. others  570,090  1,065,606  367,679  2,003,375  28.46 53.19  18.35 
Finance 9,474,461  3,925,436  2,945,026  16,344,923  57.97 24.02  18.02 
. equalization  0  747,715  467,916  1,215,631  0.00 61.51  38.49 
. revenue-sharing  5,881,071  593,661  0  6,474,732  90.83 9.17  0.00 
. public debt interest 
and management  3,593,390  2,433,204  2,446,964  8,473,558  42.41 28.72  28.88 
. others  0  150,856  30,146  181,002  0.00 83.34  16.66 




Table 5: Public revenues, 2001 
Public revenues in 1000 SFr 
Revenue shares between gov. 
tiers (%) 
Revenue category  Confederation Cantons communes  Total  Confederation  Cantons communes
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Taxes on income and wealth  16,568,376  28,050,092 22,421,923  67,040,391  24.71 41.84  33.45 
. Income of individuals  6,350,624  18,070,485 15,721,070  40,142,179  15.82 45.02  39.16 
. Wealth of individuals  0  2,392,268  2,163,122  4,555,390  0.00 52.52  47.48 
. Corporate profits  5,868,701  4,406,141 2,613,779  12,888,621 45.53 34.19  20.28 
. Corporate capital  0  776,160  574,854  1,351,014  0.00 57.45  42.55 
. Immovable property  0  167,707  549,395  717,102  0.00 23.39  76.61 
. Capital gains  0  500,938  426,368  927,306  0.00 54.02  45.98 
. Inheritance and gifts  0  1,053,223  101,997  1,155,220  0.00 91.17  8.83 
. Transfer of immovable 
property 0  683,170  271,338  954,508  0.00 71.57  28.43 
. Withholding tax  895,846  0  0  895,846  100.00 0.00  0.00 
. Stamp tax  3,453,205  0  0  3,453,205  100.00 0.00  0.00 
Consumption or expenditure 
taxes 26,304,820  1,784,528  58,482  28,147,830  93.45 6.34  0.21 
. Turnover  17,033,104  0  0  17,033,104  100.00 0.00  0.00 
. Tobacco  1,809,465  0  0  1,809,465  100.00 0.00  0.00 
. Customs and imports duties  1,059,228  0  0  1,059,228  100.00 0.00  0.00 
. Motor fuel and petrol  4,894,548  0  0  4,894,548  100.00 0.00  0.00 
. Motorways voucher  977,872  0  0  977,872  100.00 0.00  0.00 
. Motor vehicles  0  1,725,224  0  1,725,224  0.00 100.00 0.00 
. Entertainments  0  14,433  25,339  39,772  0.00 36.29  63.71 
. Dogs  0  9,210  21,089  30,299  0.00 30.40  69.60 
. Others  530,603  35,661  12,054  578,318  91.75 6.17  2.08 
Fiscal monopolies, licenses 536,835 723,251  135,900 1,395,986  38.46 51.81  9.74 
Revenues from public 
property 1,801,548  3,035,635  2,789,413  7,626,596  23.62 39.80  36.57 
. Interests, dividends  685,790  874,544  613,324  2,173,658  31.55 40.23  28.22 
. Rents  42,140  406,625  1,355,983  1,804,748  2.33 22.53  75.13 
. Others  1,073,618  1,754,466  820,106  3,648,190  29.43 48.09  22.48 
Revenue-sharing 5,879  4,525,617  1,335,500  5,866,996  0.10 77.14  22.76 
. Federal Direct Tax  0  3,681,560  **   -  3,681,560  0.00 100.00 0.00 
. Withholding tax  0  85,350  -  85,350  0.00 100.00 0.00 
. Military tax  0  34,179  -  34,179  0.00 100.00 0.00 
. Others  5,879  724,528     730,407  0.80 99.20  0.00 
Grants-in-aid 10,483  15,987,794 6,150,565  22,148,842  0.05 72.18  27.77 
. Federal grants-in-aid  0  10,904,885 14,097  10,918,982  0.00 99.87  0.13 
. Cantonal  10,483       *838'834 5,644,758  5,655,241  0.19 0.00  99.81 
. Communal  0  4,340,837     *1'727'259 4,340,837  0.00 100.00 0.00 
. Others  0  742,072  491,710  1,233,782  0.00 60.15  39.85 
Indemnities and sales  1,525,472  9,222,386 11,466,140  22,213,998 6.87 41.52  51.62 
. Administrative fees  294,743  1,424,490  404,656  2,123,889  13.88 67.07  19.05 
. Sales of products and 
services 420,667  5,117,834  7,709,333  13,247,834  3.18 38.63  58.19 
. Sales of property  65,285  31,741  79,957  176,983  36.89 17.93  45.18 
. Others  744,777  2,648,321  3,272,194  6,665,292  11.17 39.73  49.09 
Reimbursements 2,682,798  1,861,494  99,058  4,643,350  57.78 40.09  2.13 
Total 49,436,211  65,190,797 44,456,981  159,083,989 31.08 40.98  27.95 
Source: "Finances publiques en Suisse 2001", A.F.F., Berne, 2003: 24, 28-29, 46, 80, 145, 147, 149. * 
consolidated data; this figure is not included in the total; ** subtotals are not given.  
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Table 6: Revenue structure of government tiers, 2001 
   Confederation  Cantons  communes  average
   1000 SFr.  %  1000 SFr.  %  1000 SFr.  %  % 
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Taxes on income and wealth  16,568,376 33.5  28,050,092 43.0 22,421,923  50.4 42.1 
Consumption or expenditure taxes 26,304,820 53.2  1,784,528  2.7  58,482  0.1  17.7 
Fiscal monopolies, licenses  536,835  1.1  723,251  1.1  135,900  0.3  0.9 
Revenues from public property  1,801,548  3.6  3,035,635  4.7  2,789,413  6.3  4.8 
Revenue-sharing  5,879  0.0 4,525,617  6.9 1,335,500  3.0 3.7 
Grants-in-aid 10,483  0.0  15,987,794 24.5 6,150,565  13.8 13.9 
. Federal grants-in-aid  0     10,904,885 16.7 14,097         
. Cantonal  10,483     838,834*     5,644,758  12.7    
. Communal  0     4,340,837  6.7    *1'727'259       
Fees, user charges and sales  1,525,472  3.1  9,222,386  14.1 11,466,140  25.8 14.0 
Reimbursements  2,682,798 5.4  1,861,494 2.9  99,058  0.2  2.9 
Total 49,436,211 100.0 65,190,797 100.0 44,456,981  100.0 100.0 
Source: authors' calculation based on Table 5. 




Table 7: Financial dependence of the cantons, 2001 




















1  2  3  4  5 = 2/4 6 = 3/4 
7 = 
(2+3)/4 8 
Zoug 78,538  147,848  848,188  9.3  17.4  26.7  71,733 
Basle-Town 254,730  121,859  4,010,686  6.4  3.0  9.4  63,002 
Zurich 1,322,780  628,949  10,557,020 12.5  6.0  18.5  58,540 
Nidwald  91,492  21,099 314,822 29.1  6.7  35.8  53,189 
Basle-Land  224,071 78,484 2,209,127  10.1  3.6  13.7  51,853 
Geneva 373,434  275,240  6,611,547  5.6  4.2  9.8  49,969 
Schaffhouse  59,954  38,510 561,180 10.7  6.9  17.5  49,322 
Argovie 464,626  241,877  3,516,202  13.2  6.9  20.1  48,808 
Schwyz  155,599 106,922  756,413 20.6  14.1 34.7  47,862 
Vaud 922,361  296,596  6,169,875  14.9  4.8  19.8  47,748 
Glaris  52,319  25,964 328,772 15.9  7.9  23.8  47,249 
Uri  212,756 19,846 454,333 46.8  4.4  51.2  42,966 
Appenzell  Rh.-Ext.  74,419  35,329 369,984 20.1  9.5  29.7  42,934 
Soleure  267,510 97,591 1,538,637  17.4  6.3  23.7  42,927 
Saint-Gall 616,237  189,385  3,465,658  17.8  5.5  23.2  42,926 
Thurgovie 201,758  102,576  1,468,142  13.7  7.0  20.7  42,357 
Grisons 682,921  105,933  1,803,620  37.9  5.9  43.7  41,339 
Lucerne 541,802  172,005  2,692,765  20.1  6.4  26.5  41,136 
Berne  1,668,485 511,452  7,698,561 21.7  6.6  28.3  40,697 
Neuchâtel 436,212  128,961  1,577,809  27.6  8.2  35.8  39,858 
Fribourg 557,440  165,044  2,101,742  26.5  7.9  34.4  37,748 
Tessin 425,219  203,093  2,604,943  16.3  7.8  24.1  36,665 
Obwald  112,975 26,271 278,191 40.6  9.4  50.1  35,427 
Valais 766,589  246,669  2,400,310  31.9  10.3  42.2  35,309 
Jura  309,965 57,622 742,905 41.7  7.8  49.5  33,616 
Appenzell  Rh.-Int.  30,693  12,577 109,365 28.1  11.5 39.6  32,940 
Switzerland 10,904,885 4,057,702 65,190,797 16.7  6.2  23.0  46,970 
Source: Finances publiques en Suisse 2001, A.F.F., Berne. Columns 2 and 3: page 73; 
column 4: page 67 (= Table 1 col. 10); column 8: see Table 1.  
 
73
Table 8: Indices of tax burden in the cantons and communes, 2001 (in points) 
Individual Legal  Entities 





1  2 3 4 5 6  7 
Zurich  86.3 56.2 106.5  100.5  96.4 87 
Berne  115.9 113.6 101.2 68.4  137.8 115 
Lucerne  124.8 112.3 93.4  118.7 96.3  121 
Uri 118.9  84.1  111.2  121.4  80.6  114 
Schwyz  67.4 48.6 54.2 52  96.1 65 
Obwald 127.8  108.5  100.4  91.3  89.8  123 
Nidwald  79.6 40.2 76.1 50  81.6 75 
Glaris  110.4 72.5  106  105.9 103.2 106 
Zoug  49.5 50  58  22.7 82.8 51 
Fribourg  126.6 167.1 105.5 103.4 108  127 
Soleure 115.1  94.1  102.7  124.8  88.4  112 
Bâle-Ville  117.4 132.7 107.8 148.4 107.7 119 
Bâle-Campagne 88.7  97.4  105.7 213.2 110.8 94 
Schaffhouse  116.2  96.4 83.9 94.9 64.8 110 
Appenzell  Rh.-Ext.  110.2  94.3 83.8 24.5 116.1  106 
Appenzell  Rh.-Int.  90.9 67.6 73  22.8 97.1 85 
Saint-Gall  101.2 107.2 106.3 28.8  103.9 101 
Grisons  93.2  106.1 111.1 182.7 137  103 
Argovie  87.7 74  96.5 133.4  74.7 88 
Thurgovie 109  126.2  92.9  138  70.5  109 
Tessin  81.3 75.8 94.3 101.4  92.8 84 
Vaud  106.8 146.6 125.7 76.9  130.5 112 
Valais  109.7 299.4 97.1  135.6 53.6  121 
Neuchâtel 124  140.5  105.9  142  99.8  122 
Geneva  86  126.8 124.1 114.4 68.9  96 
Jura  132.4 172  100.3 134.4 125.5 132 
Average  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 
Max/min  ratio  2.67 7.45 2.32 9.39 2.57 2.60 
Source:  "Charge fiscale en Suisse 2001", A.F.F., Berne, 2002: 62, 76, 89. 
 
74
Table 9: Economic classification of public expenditures 2001 
 
in 1000 SFr  in %  Category of public 
expenditure  Confederation Cantons communes Confederation  Cantons  communes
1  2 3  4 5  6  7 
Current account  19,938,391  34,660,985 27,317,580 0.39 0.54  0.65 
Personnel 5,809,558  23,414,798 15,943,576 0.11  0.37  0.38 
Consumption 4,851,329  7,652,155  8,906,188  0.09  0.12  0.21 
Interest 3,396,433  2,252,656  1,999,901  0.07  0.04  0.05 
Revenue sharing  5,881,071  1,341,376  467,915  0.12  0.02  0.01 
Grants-in-aid   23,091,206  21,695,725 9,147,587  0.45  0.34  0.22 
    - public sector                   
      . Confederation  0  8,738  0  0  0.00  0 
      . Cantons  8,132,083  836,139*  4,241,038  0.16  0  0.10 
      . communes  0  4,893,492  1,625,124* 0  0.08  0 
    - semi-public sector  10,547,559  4,090,905  698,436  0.21  0.06  0.02 
    - foreign countries  1,724,283  0  0  0.03  0  0 
    - private sector  2,687,281  12,702,590 4,208,113  0.05  0.20  0.10 
Capital account  8,106,891  7,578,191 5,243,838 0.16  0.12  0.13 
Own investments  892,930  5,167,961  4,763,174  0.02  0.08  0.11 
Loans and contributions  3,441,283  317,650  109,794  0.07  0.00  0.00 
Grants-in-aid   3,772,678  2,087,396  363,177  0.07  0.03  0.01 
    - public sector                   
      . Confederation  0  1,745  0  0  0.00  0 
      . Cantons  2,535,304  2,695*  99,799  0.05  0  0.00 
      . communes  0  751,266  102135*  0  0.01  0 
    - semi-public sector  914,037  416,451  112,259  0.02  0.01  0.003 
    - private sector  323,337  917,934  151,119  0.01  0.01  0.004 
Other 0  5,184  7,693  0  0.0001  0.0002 
Total 51,136,488  63,934,901 41,709,005 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Source: "Finances publiques en Suisse 2001", A.F.F., Berne, 2003: 22, 44, 78. 
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